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ABSTRACT
The thesis introduces a new physical side-channel, which we call the backscattering
side-channel, and propose novel hardware Trojan (HT) and counterfeit integrated circuit
(IC) detection techniques that exploit the backscattering side-channel. These techniques
are capable of detecting different types of inactive HTs and counterfeit ICs on multiple
circuit benchmarks while tolerating manufacturing variation.
For the last decade, demand for effective HT and counterfeit IC detection techniques
has risen considerably. Numerous HT and counterfeit IC detection techniques have been
published and side-channel analysis based approaches are among the most widely used.
However, the problem with existing side-channels is that they do not provide enough res-
olution bandwidth, and information about the operation of electronic circuitry to detect
small dormant hardware Trojan and small-changed counterfeit ICs. In addition, most pre-
viously proposed techniques do not take into account manufacturing variation, test on
very few benchmarks, or rely on an unrealistic assumption of having a golden (HT-free
or trusted-IC) sample. Motivated by these problems, our research focuses on introducing a
new side-channel, i.e., the backscattering side-channel, and proposing novel techniques for
HT and counterfiet IC detection using the new side-channel. We observe that the backscat-
tering side-channel is especially suitable for HT detection because it has high bandwidth
and spatial resolution, and its signal carries information about the current state of on-chip
impedances.
To summarize, this work has 1) introduced a new backscattering side-channel, theoret-
ically and experimentally proved the concept and existence of the side-channel, 2) devel-
oped new techniques for detection of dormant hardware Trojans and counterfeit ICs using
the new backscattering side-channel, 3) modeled and compared the backscattering, elec-
tromagnetic (EM), and power side-channels and their performance in detecting software
malware and hardware Trojans , 4) developed novel clustering based techniques that can
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assist reverse engineering based methods for HT detection in a large population of inte-
grated circuits, and 5) developed novel golden-chip-free HT detection techniques using





Integrated circuits (IC) have become an integral aspect of our lives, by controlling most of
electronic devices ranging from cellphones and washing machines to airplanes and rockets.
Thus, the problem of ensuring authenticity and trust for ICs is critically important, espe-
cially for sensitive fields such as military, finance, and governmental infrastructure, and is
gaining in importance as an increasing number of “things” become “smart” and connected
into the Internet-of-Things (IoT). However, cost and time-to-market considerations have
led IC vendors to outsource some, and in most cases many, steps in the IC supply chain.
The sheer number and diversity of entities involved in modern IC supply chain, each with
its own set of potentially malicious actors that can insert malicious modifications, referred
as hardware Trojan (HT), in the IC [1], makes it difficult to trust the resulting ICs. In ad-
dition, it also leads to another severe security vulnerability, which is counterfeiting. The
potential existence of HTs and counterfeit ICs significantly undermines the trust in any sys-
tem that uses that IC, because the hardware usually provides the base layer of security and
trust that all software layers depend and build on [2, 3, 4]. As a result, demand for effective
HT and counterfeit IC detection techniques has risen considerably for the past few years.
For the last decade, numerous HT and counterfeit IC detection techniques have been
published and side-channel analysis based approaches are among the most widely used.
However, the problem with existing side-channels is that they do not provide enough reso-
lution bandwidth, and information about the operation of electronic circuitry to detect small
dormant hardware Trojan or counterfeit ICs with identical functionality with the authentic
ones. In addition, most previously proposed techniques do not take into account manufac-
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turing variation, test on very few benchmarks, or rely on unrealistic assumptions to detect
HTs and/or counterfeit ICs.
Motivated by these problems, this research introduces a new physical side-channel,
i.e., the backscattering side-channel, and proposes new HT and counterfeit IC detection
techniques using this side-channel.
1.2 Creating a Backscattering Side-Channel to Enable Detection of Dormant Hard-
ware Trojans
An hardware Trojan (HT) is a malicious modification of the circuitry of an integrated cir-
cuit. An hardware Trojan is completely characterized by its physical representation and its
behavior. Typically, an HT is designed to be stealthy, so it only changes the functionality
of the original circuit when specific conditions have been met. Thus the design of an HT
typically has two key components: the payload, which implements the modification of the
original circuit’s behavior1, and the trigger, which detects when the conditions for activat-
ing the payload have been met. The conditions that activate an HT occur very rarely, and
until activated the payload is usually highly inert - it simply allows the IC to follow its orig-
inal input/output behavior. This makes HTs extremely challenging to detect by traditional
functional verification and testing - test inputs are unlikely to activate the HT, and without
activation the HT has no effect on functional behavior of the IC. As a result, a plethora
of counter-HT approaches have been proposed and they can be generally categorized into
protection and detection techniques.
Protection techniques focus on making the IC resilient to the presence of HTs, i.e.,
on preventing the HT’s payload from modifying the behavior of the IC, mostly by using
fault-tolerance-inspired approaches to operate correctly even when an HT has been able to
modify some of the internal signals. However, these techniques protect only certain parts of
1The HT’s payload can also implement a non-functional change in the IC’s behavior, e.g. to increase its
power consumption, increase the IC’s side-channel leakage of information, decrease its expected lifetime,
etc.
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the system, such as a bus [5] or on-chip interconnect [6], require redundant activity during
normal operation [7], and/or rely on reconfigurable logic [8].
Most counter-HT techniques focus on detecting the presence of HTs. Some HT detec-
tion approaches are destructive, e.g., relying on successive removal of the IC’s layers to
scan the actual layout of the IC, reverse-engineer its GDSII and/or netlist-level design [9],
and compare it to a trusted design. However, all the ICs that are found to be HT-free through
such analysis are also destroyed by the scan, and the reverse-engineering is extremely ex-
pensive and time-consuming, so such destructive techniques can only be applied to a small
sample of the larger population of IC.
Non-destructive HT detection approaches can be categorized according to whether they
are applied to the design of the yet-to-be-fabricated IC (pre-silicon approaches), or to fab-
ricated IC (post-silicon approaches). Pre-silicon approaches use functional validation, and
code and gate-level netlist analysis [10, 11], but they cannot detect HTs that are inserted
after the design stage, e.g., by editing the physical layout of the IC at the foundry. To over-
come such concerns, post-silicon methods attempt to identify HTs in ICs received from the
foundry.
Post-silicon non-destructive approaches detect HTs either through testing the functional
properties of the IC, or by measuring non-functional (side-channel) behavior of the IC as it
operates. Functional testing involves finding inputs that are likely to trigger unknown HTs
that may exist in the IC, causing the payload of the HT to propagate the effects of the pay-
load to the outputs of the IC, where they can be found to differ from expected outputs [12].
However, trigger conditions for HTs are designed to be difficult to reach accidentally, so
the probability of detecting HTs is extremely low for conventional functional testing tech-
niques. Additionally, functional testing techniques are likely to fail in detecting HTs whose
payload does not change the input/output behavior or the IC, but rather causes increased
power consumption, side-channel leakage of sensitive information, etc.
Among post-silicon approaches, HT detection through side-channel analysis appears
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to be the most effective and widely used approach [13, 14]. These methods measure one
or more non-functional properties of the IC as it operates, and compare these measure-
ments to reference signals obtained through either simulation or measurement on a device
known to be genuine. side-channels used by HT detection techniques include power con-
sumption [15, 16, 17, 18], leakage current [19], temperature [20, 21], and electromagnetic
emanations (EM) [22, 23, 24], and some approaches even combine measurements from
multiple side-channels [25, 26].
Among side-channel-based HT detection approaches, some add the side-channel mea-
surement capability to the chip, while others rely on measurements that are external to
the chip itself. With on-chip measurements, the measurement circuitry is added to the de-
sign [27, 28, 29], which allows the specific chosen signals to be measured close to the
signal’s source. However, the additional circuitry for measurements, and for routing the
desired signals to the measurement circuitry, impacts chip size, manufacturing cost, perfor-
mance, and power, and this impact increases as the set of individually measurable signals
increases.
Finally, external-measurement side-channel techniques require no modifications to the
IC itself, and instead rely on externally observable side-effects of the IC’s normal activity.
Since an HT is typically much smaller than the original circuit, an ideal side-channel signal
would have little noise and interference so that the HT’s small contribution to the signal is
not obscured by the noise. Additionally, the HT’s payload is largely inert until activated,
and activation during measurement is highly unlikely, so ideally the side-channel signal
would be affected by the presence of the payload circuitry, even when it is inert. Finally,
before activation, what little switching activity the HT does create is in its trigger com-
ponent, which usually has only brief bursts of switching when the inputs it is monitoring
change. Thus an ideal side-channel signal would have high bandwidth, such that these brief
bursts of current fluctuation due to switching activity in the HT can be identified.
Unfortunately, as mentioned earlier, existing externally-measurable side-channel sig-
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nals, such as temperature, voltage, power consumption, and electromagnetic emanations [22],
tend to vary mostly in response to current variation due to switching activity. However, tem-
perature changes slowly and has very limited bandwidth, and voltage and supply current
have low bandwidth [24] because on-chip capacitances that help limit supply voltage fluc-
tuation act as a low-pass filter with respect to both current and voltage as seen from outside
the chip. Electromagnetic emanations can have high bandwidth, but their signal-to-noise
ratio is affected by noise and interference.
Motivated by the above-mentioned drawbacks of previous techniques, this thesis in-
troduces a new physical side-channel, i.e., the backscattering side-channel, that is created
by transmitting a signal toward the IC, where the internal impedance changes caused by
on-chip switching activity modulate the signal that is backscattered (reflected) from the IC.
To demonstrate how this new side-channel can be used to detect small changes in circuit
impedances, we use it to implement a new proof-of-concept method for non-destructively
detecting HTs from outside of the chip. To our knowledge, this is the first off-chip side-
channel technique capable of detecting inactive HTs while tolerating variations that exist
across hardware instances. Also, to our knowledge, backscattering has never before been
used as a side-channel signal to infer information about the operation of electronic circuitry,
even though backscattering has been used extensively for RFID tags and other short-range
communications [30].
We observe that backscattering not only can be used as a side-channel signal, but also
that it is especially suitable for HT detection because the backscattered signal carries infor-
mation about the current state of on-chip impedances, unlike traditional side-channels that
carry information about brief changes in current. Furthermore, like the traditional EM side-
channel, the backscattering side-channel has high bandwidth but, unlike the traditional EM
signal, the strength of the backscattered signal can be increased when needed, its frequency
can be shifted to avoid noise, interference, and poor signal propagation conditions, and it
can be more accurately focused on a specific part of the chip.
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We test our new HT detection technique using multiple HTs from the Trusthub bench-
mark [31] and show that it is highly accurate in detecting even inactive HTs while avoiding
false positives. We compare our approach to one that applies the same signal analysis
to traditional electromagnetic emanations, and our results confirm backscattering yields a
dramatic improvement in HT detection accuracy. We further evaluate the sensitivity of
our approach by separately reducing the size of the HT’s trigger and payload components,
and showing that HT detection of inactive HTs largely depends on the size of the trigger
component, and that our approach can detect even HTs with significantly reduced triggers.
Additionally, we also evaluate how our approach is affected by manufacturing and other
variations, by using different physical instances of the same design for training and testing,
and find that the technique largely maintains its ability to detect HTs accurately even when
trained on only one instance and used to test another.
1.3 A Comparison of Backscattering, EM, and Power Side-Channels and Their Per-
formance in Detecting Software and Hardware Intrusions
Side-channel analysis is a powerful tool from both an attacker’s and defender’s perspec-
tive. Attackers use side-channels to circumvent traditional access controls and protections
by exploiting the observable side effects of computation rather than attacking the compu-
tation’s functionality. Computations have many observable side effects through an analog
medium, such as power consumption [32, 33, 34], sound [35, 36], and electromagnetic
emanations [37, 38, 39], that can be exploited to create side-channel attacks. A number
of studies have been published on preventing side-channel attacks and the leakage of sen-
sitive information. For example, several countermeasures for protecting video displays
and smart-cards from EM leakage involve low-cost shielding techniques, the use of asyn-
chronous circuits, or changing the layout of circuitry [40, 41, 42, 43, 44]. Additionally,
research has demonstrated methods for systematically identifying and quantifying EM side-
channel signals [45, 46, 47, 48].
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Defenders use side-channels for tracking program activities on various code levels such
as loops, paths, basic blocks, and individual instructions [49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57,
58, 59], as well as for hardware Trojan detection [13]. Side-channel analysis for tracking
program activities relies on monitoring a device’s power or EM fluctuations and relating
them to software activities on a device’s processor. This analysis has been used for protect-
ing against attacks targeting the battery life of hand-held mobile devices [49], for integrity
assessment of Software Defined Radios [50], for malware detection on embedded medical
devices [60], IoT (Internet of Things) devices [61, 62, 63], etc. Side-channel analysis for
HT detection relies on measuring non-functional properties from outside the integrated cir-
cuit (IC), and comparing the measurements to reference signals produced by either simula-
tion or a golden example. Side-channels used for HT detection include power consumption
[15, 16, 18, 17], leakage current [19], temperature [20, 21], EM [22, 23, 24], a combination
of multiple side-channels [25, 26], and more recently backscattering side-channels [64].
The backscattering side-channel is a consequence of impedance changes in switching cir-
cuits. One example of such a side-channel is when digital logic activity causes incoming
EM signals to be modulated as they are reflected (backscattered) at frequencies that depend
on both the incoming EM signal and the circuit activity.
All previous work indicates that backscattering, EM, and power side-channel analysis
can be a powerful tool for both attackers and defenders; however, it is not clear which type
of side-channels provides the most useful information. Hence, the objective of this work
is to model and quantitatively compare the backscattering, EM, and power side-channels
and their performance in detecting malware and HTs. We start by describing the backscat-
tering side-channel and comparing it with EM and power side-channels, two of the more
widely used types of side-channels. Then, we characterize, model, and compare spectral
characteristics of all three side-channels. Finally, we compare the performance of all three
side-channels in detecting malware and HTs. The results show that for larger changes in
the signals, such as those caused by malware intrusions, all three side-channels perform
7
similarly. However, when smaller changes need to be observed, such as those caused by
HTs, the backscattering side-channel outperforms the EM and power side-channels.
1.4 A Novel Golden-Chip-Free Clustering Technique Using Backscattering Side-
Channel for Hardware Trojan Detection
As we discussed earlier, over the past few years, a significant shift in the manufacturing
model and design flow of IC companies has been observed due to various factors including
time-to-market, cost reduction demands, and the increased complexity of ICs. These com-
panies have fully adopted the “horizontal model”, in which they use IPs from third-party
companies and outsource all hardware fabrication to offshore foundries. While the new
design flow model allows for reduction in the cost, time-to-market and fabrication errors, it
raises questions on the hardware level trust because HTs could be injected into an IC by ad-
versaries at any stage of the design and fabrication flow. HT insertion at the foundry is the
most common scenario because IC companies fabricate their chips in offshore foundries,
which are harder to secure. Hence, numerous HT detection techniques are proposed to de-
tect HT insertion at the foundry stage. These techniques can be classified into two groups:
reverse engineering and side-channel approaches.
Reverse-engineering techniques rely on destructive scanning the actual IC layout to
re-build the GDSII and netlist level of the chip [9]-[70]. The destructive scanning process
consists of decapsulation to remove the die from the package, de-layering to strip each layer
off the die, and imaging to reconstruct images for every layer. After getting the GDSII and
netlist level of the chip, these techniques are capable of detecting any malicious post-RTL-
design insertion with very high accuracy by comparing them to the GDSII and netlist of a
trusted design. However, reverse-engineering is extremely time-consuming, expensive and
destructive because of chip demolishing after reverse engineering. Therefore, applying re-
verse engineering based HT detection techniques to test a large population of ICs, although
accurate and reliable, it is not practical.
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On the other hand, side-channel analysis based approaches rely on measuring some
non-functional properties from outside of the IC while it operates, and comparing the mea-
surements to reference signals produced by either simulation [22]-[72] or by a “golden-
sample” device [73]. Potential side-channels include backscattering [73], power consump-
tion [15], [16], leakage current [74], temperature [20], electromagnetic emanations (EM)
[22], [24], or a combination of multiple side-channels [25], [26]. In some techniques, ad-
ditional measurement circuitry is added to the design [28], [29], which allows the specific
signals to be measured close to the signal source. However, additional circuitry results in
circuit size, manufacturing cost, performance, and power overhead. Therefore, the majority
of side-channel based detection techniques require no modifications to the chip itself, and
rely on measuring side-channel signals outside of the chip. In contrast to reverse engineer-
ing techniques, the side-channel based techniques can be applied to a large population of
ICs because side-channel measurements do not require damaging the board while conduct-
ing testing. However, the disadvantage of side-channel techniques is their dependence on
either having a “golden” (HT-free) chip, which is not a practical assumption for foundry-
inserted HTs in single-source ICs, or having a detailed simulation model, which is often
impractical (complex ICs, 3rd-party IP, etc.).
To overcome these shortcomings of both types of approaches, we propose a novel
“golden-chip-free” clustering algorithm using backscattering side-channel. This technique
is bridging the gap between destructive reverse-engineering and traditional side-channel
detection techniques. The proposed clustering algorithm clusters a large population of ICs
based on the effect of a hypothetical HT would have on the backscattering side-channel
signal. In practical terms, the technique creates clusters such that the ICs in each clus-
ter can be considered equivalent in terms of presence or absence of an HT. This allows
reverse-engineering of one IC in each cluster to be used to assess the status (in terms of HT
presence and nature) of that entire cluster.
A number of techniques utilizing clustering algorithms for HT detection have been
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previously proposed [75]-[77], however, the majority of these methods are pre-silicon ap-
proaches, which means that they can not detect HTs inserted in the fabrication stage [75]-
[76]. A post-silicon clustering technique using side-channel analysis has been proposed in
[77], but authors only test their method on a set of two FPGAs, which does not give enough
statistics to evaluate manufacturing variations among different hardware instances. In ad-
dition, the technique uses power side-channel, which provides very limited resolution and
bandwidth [73]. Unlike these previous approaches, our technique works for HTs inserted at
foundries without needing a golden chip or any a priori knowledge of the chip circuitry. We
have tested the proposed technique on a set of 100 boards which provides enough statistics
for manufacturing variation and show that our technique outperforms other side-channels
for HT detections [73]. We evaluate our clustering algorithm for multiple HT and circuit
benchmark designs over a set of 100 boards, in which each board will be randomly loaded
with either a HT-free or an HT-infected design. In all these experiments the HT (if present)
is in a dormant state, i.e., none of the HTs are activated during this evaluation. The re-
sults show that our technique is capable of clustering all boards correctly for 9 different
Trojan designs on 3 different benchmark circuits from Trusthub [31] with 100 % accuracy.
In additional experiments, we make HTs more stealthy by reducing the size of their trig-
ger, resulting in trigger circuits that are as small as 0.19% of the original circuit, and find
out that our technique still correctly clusters the boards. The following summarizes the
contributions of this work:
• This work describes a novel clustering algorithm that is capable of classifying a large
population of ICs into clusters without having a “golden” (known-to-be-HT-free)
chip, and with no a priori knowledge about circuitry of the chip. The algorithm is
based on clustering spectral features of backscattering side-channel that tend to be
the most impacted by dormant HTs.
• This work describes a testing environment that includes a set of 100 boards and
implemented multiple HT benchmarks. This large set of boards allows a thorough
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evaluation of the manufacturing variation among different hardware instances with
enough statistics, which has not been done before.
1.5 Counterfeit IC Detection Using Backscattering Side-Channel
A counterfeit IC is an illicit copy of a legitimate chip, typically with some difference in
terms of performance, characteristics, or materials, but which is sold or used as a legitimate
(authorized) IC [78]. Counterfeiting of ICs has become a major challenge for the semicon-
ductor industry, in large part because existing test techniques and protection mechanisms
are not very effective in detecting counterfeit ICs. Unfortunately, over the past few decades
the problem has been getting worse, because globalization of the semiconductor supply
chain has led companies to outsource many steps of their integrated circuit (IC) production
cycle, and incidences of counterfeit ICs have increased rapidly. In 2015, it was reported
that the illicit production of counterfeit ICs has cost IC companies $100 billion [79, 80],
and that this cost has steadily increased. This has been, and still is, a significant threat to the
IC industry, not only because it negatively impacts innovation and economic growth, but
also because it represents a serious threat/risk for systems that incorporate these counterfeit
ICs. In practice, counterfeit ICs have found their way into almost all industrial sectors, in-
cluding ones that are highly sensitive to potential security, reliability, and other risks: cloud
infrastructure, finance, government infrastructure, military systems, etc. As a result, the
need for effective detection of counterfeit ICs has increased tremendously.
Over the past few years, a plethora of papers have been published on the topic of coun-
terfeit ICs. Such work can be roughly divided into detection and avoidance techniques [81].
Avoidance aims to make counterfeits easily detectable, e.g. by adding circuitry to legiti-
mate ICs to act as a signature/watermark [78, 82, 83], by fabricating different parts of the
chip layout in different foundries [84], etc. However, avoidance techniques significantly
add to the cost of an IC, which prevents them from widespread adoption.
In contrast, techniques for detection of counterfeit IC detection focus on distinguish-
11
ing counterfeit ICs from authentic ones, usualy without adding circuitry to the IC, chang-
ing its layout, etc. Detection techniques can be based on either physical tests or electrical
tests [85]. Physical tests rely on examining the physical and chemical/material properties of
the IC’s package, leads, and die in order to detect procedural, mechanical, and environmen-
tal deviations in counterfeit ICs [84]. These techniques include external visual inspection
(EVI), X-ray imaging, resurfacing, microscopy scanning, material analysis such as X-Ray
Fluorescence (XRF), Fourier transform infrared spec. (FTIR), ion chromatography [86,
87], etc. While physical tests can, in principle, be used to detect all types of counterfeit
ICs, the more reliable such tests are destructive, time-consuming, and expensive [85, 84].
Electrical tests consist of parameter tests, function tests, curve tracing, built-in tests and
structural tests [79, 88, 89]. Unlike physical tests, electrical tests are non-destructive, rela-
tively fast, and inexpensive. However, electrical tests rely on determining whether the IC’s
functionality is correct, which does not detect counterfeit ICs that have the same function-
ality but different layout as authentic ones. In addition, reliable detection of counterfeits
typically necessitates use of a number of electrical test techniques, some of which require
extra circuitry to be added to the design, so the total added IC cost for all these techniques
can be significant.
Motivated by the above-mentioned drawbacks of previous detection techniques, this
work proposes a novel non-destructive and fast technique using the backscattering side-
channel for detection of counterfeit ICs with the same functionality, but different layout,
with authentic ones. This includes ICs that contain hardware Trojan horses, such that
the functionality of the counterfeit IC is identical to that of a legitimate IC, except under
very specific conditions that are highly unlikely to be encountered during electrial test-
ing. We choose to use backscattering side-channel, a new physical side-channel that has
been demonstrated to outperform other side-channels in terms of detecting hardware Tro-
jan horses (HTs) in ICs [64]. However, in this work we focus on detecting changes in IC
layout and placement, i.e. detecting counterfeit ICs that are functionally exact equivalents
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of legitimate ICs, without any additional logic gates (or connections between those gates).
1.6 Golden-Chip-Free Hardware Trojan Detection Technique Using Backscattering
Side-Channel
As we discussed earlier, side-channel analysis approaches are the most widely used HT
detection techniques. They have advantages of being non-destructive and relatively fast,
which is suitable for testing a large number of ICs. However, the main drawback of most
existing side-channel HT detection techniques is the dependence on having a golden (HT-
free) chip for training [20, 23, 18]. The assumption of having a golden sample is too strong,
and often unrealistic, which prevents them from being used for practical deployments of
HT detection.
There are few papers that propose to circumvent this problem by using simulation
and/or modeling in lieu of a golden chip. In [22], the authors present a method using
EM side-channel to detect HTs without having to have a golden circuit and the technique
was tested with multiple different Trojans from Trusthub. However, in the paper, the au-
thors use the EM side-channel, which is proved to have multiple shortcomings when used
for HT detection [64]. Furthermore, hardware Trojans were activated in the experiments.
This is not practical because it is extremely difficult to activate Trojans without a priori
knowledge of their triggering mechanism. As a result, it is not clear that how their tech-
nique would perform with dormant hardware Trojans and its applicability to larger and
more complicated circuits.
Another post-silicon technique utilizing side-channel analysis without the need of hav-
ing a golden-free-chip has been proposed in [77], but the technique relies on using power
side-channel, which provides very limited resolution and bandwidth as discussed above.
In addition, [75] presents an information-theoretic approach that estimates the statistical
correlation between the signals in a design and then use a weight normalization and clus-
tering algorithm to detect HTs. In [11], the authors propose COTD, a HT detection tech-
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nique based on analyses of the controllability and observability of gate-level netlist and
utilizing an unsupervised clustering to detect HTs by exploiting significant inter-cluster
distance caused by the controllability and observability characteristics of the Trojan gates.
In [76], a technique based on “outliers”, is proposed to identify suspicious signals in a
netlist, and clustering technique to detect HTs. However, all of these methods are pre-
silicon approaches, which means that they can not detect HTs inserted in the fabrication
stage.
Motivated by the shortcomings of the previous techniques, this work proposes a novel
golden-chip-free hardware Trojan detection technique using backscattering side-channel
with circuit impedance models. As we mentioned earlier, backscattering side-channel out-
performs other side-channels in hardware Trojan detection because it is impedance-based,
which means it gives information about the impedance change inside the chip. When a
HT is attached to the circuit, it changes the circuit impedance, regardless of whether it
is activated or not. We build models that help calculate the reference impedances of the
benchmark circuits and estimate the expected power of the backscattered signal of clock
harmonics. Then we compare them against the measurements to detect HTs without having
to have an golden sample.
We start with simple circuits such as a transistor, then build up to impedance models for
more complicated circuits. These models are used to calculate the reference impedances of
the circuits, and estimate reference power of clock harmonics. Then we use them for HT
detection. Our algorithm reports a design as Trojan-free if the real measurements matches
its model’s reference, and report a design as Trojan-infected otherwise. We test our tech-
nique on multiple Trojan benchmarks and the results show that our technique can detect
Trojan with 100% accuracy and 0% false positives, if the Trojan trigger is big enough.
1.7 Research Contributions
The research contributions of this thesis are
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• Introduce a new physical side-channel, i.e., the backscattering side-channel, that is
created by transmitting a signal toward the IC, where the internal impedance changes
caused by on-chip switching activity modulate the signal that is backscattered (re-
flected) from the IC [64].
• Theoretically and experimentally prove the existence and the concept of the new
backscattering side-channel. Demonstrate measurements for the backscattering side-
channel [64].
• Propose a new method for non-destructively detecting HTs from outside of the chip
using the backscattering side-channel [64]. To our knowledge, this is the first off-
chip side-channel technique capable of detecting inactive HTs while tolerating vari-
ations that exist across hardware instances. Also, to our knowledge, backscattering
has never before been used as a side-channel signal to infer information about the
operation of electronic circuitry.
• Model and quantitatively compare backscattering, electromagnetic (EM), and power
side-channels and discuss the performance of these three side-channels for detecting
software malware and hardware Trojans [90].
• Describe a novel clustering algorithm that is capable of classifying a large population
of ICs into clusters without having a “golden” (known-to-be-HT-free) chip, and with
no a priori knowledge about circuitry of the chip. The algorithm is based on cluster-
ing spectral features of backscattering side-channel that tend to be the most impacted
by dormant HTs [91].
• Describe a testing environment that includes a set of 100 boards and implemented
multiple HT benchmarks. This large set of boards allows a thorough evaluation of the
manufacturing variation among different hardware instances with enough statistics,
which has not been done before [91].
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• Propose a novel method that uses the backscattering side-channel to cluster ICs such
that counterfeits are separated from legitimate ICs [92].
• Build circuit impedance models and demonstrate a golden-chip-free hardware Trojan
technique using backscattering side-channel by relying on circuit impedance models.
1.8 Thesis Outline
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 presents background of HTs,
counterfeit ICs, and the side-channels. Chapter 3 discusses creating a backscattering side-
channel to enable detection of dormant hardware Trojans. Chapter 4 presents modeling
and comparison of backscattering, EM, and power side-channels and their performance
in detecting software and hardware intrusions. Chapter 5 proposes a novel golden-chip-
free clustering technique using backscattering side-channel for hardware Trojan detection.
Chapter 6 presents counterfeit IC detection using backscattering side-channel. Chapter 7
proposes a golden-chip-free hardware Trojan technique using backscattering side-channel
by relying on circuit impedance models. Finally, chapter 8 summarizes thesis contributions,





2.1.1 The Emerging Thread of Hardware Trojan
Most software systems are built on the assumption that the underlying hardware can be
trusted to perform the requested operations correctly, and even when incorrect hardware
behavior is considered, it is assumed to be erroneous rather than malicious. HTs break this
assumption, so the potential presence of unknown HTs in the system’s hardware effectively
eliminates trust in the overall system regardless of how trustworthy the system’s software
is. Over the past several years, numerous papers have been published on the topic of under-
standing the intent, behavior [14, 93], and implementation of HTs [94, 95, 96, 31]. Several
studies have focused on characterizing and classifying HTs [97, 13, 98, 31] according to
activation mechanism, functionality, location on the IC, the point in the IC design cycle and
supply chain at which they are inserted, etc.
A common characteristic of HTs is that they are designed to avoid detection, so they
activate their malicious activity rarely to avoid being relatively easily detected, e.g., during
functional testing of the IC [93]. Therefore, a typical HT consists of a trigger circuit and
payload circuit, as illustrated in Fig. 2.1. The trigger circuit is monitoring a set of signals to
detect when the conditions for activation of the payload have been met, while the payload
implements the actual malicious functionality. The malicious activity can be functional,
e.g., when the HT’s output modifies the outputs of the overall circuit to cause harm or
leak sensitive information, and/or non-functional, e.g., when the payload increases power
consumption, causes excessive wear-out to reduce the lifetime of the IC, leaks sensitive
















Figure 2.1: Simplified Block Diagram of an HT.
2.1.2 Adversaries and Attacks
The life cycle of an IC is depicted on the left side of Fig. 2.2. Ideally, all of the steps in
this life-cycle would be performed by a single trusted entity, which would design, fabricate,
test, package, and deploy the IC. However, cost-reduction, time-to-market, IC complexity,
and other considerations have recently led companies to specialize in a single step in the IC
design and/or manufacturing, so the overall IC is typically designed by one entity, usually
includes intellectual property (IP) blocks of several other entities and design tools from
yet another entity, is fabricated, tested, and packaged by one or more other entities, and
is finally deployed by yet another entity. Different parts of the life cycle typically also
take place in several different countries. Technically, HTs could be injected to an IC by
adversaries at any stage of its design and fabrication flow.
A subset of opportunities for inserting HTs into the IC is shown on the right side of
Fig. 2.2, but technically, HTs could be injected to an IC by adversaries at any stage of its
design and fabrication flow.
2.1.3 Hardware Trojans: Taxonomy
As the number and complexity of HTs increased dramatically, several studies on the topic
of characterizing and classifying HTs have been published over the last few years [31]-[97].
The most comprehensive work to date is proposed by [31]. Figure 2.3 illustrates different
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Figure 2.2: Examples of HT insertion activity in IC life cycle [93].
ways of classifying HTs. As shown in the figure, HTs can be classified by their activation
mechanism, functionality, or the phase in the IC design flow they are inserted into the chip.
2.2 Counterfeit IC
A counterfeit IC is an illicit copy of a legitimate chip, typically different in terms of per-
formance, characteristics, and/or material, but which is sold and/or used as if it was a
legitimate (authorized) IC [78]. There are three major categories of counterfeit ICs: re-
marked/recycled ICs, out-of-spec/defective ICs, and cloned ICs [78]. The first group in-
cludes aged ICs sold as new, ICs remarked with forged information to mimic more ex-
pensive (e.g. higher-rating) ICs, etc. The second group includes out of specification ICs,
ICs that were rejected during manufacturing tests but sold as normal ones, and ICs that
have been tampered with during manufacturing (e.g. to infect them with a hardware Trojan
horse). The last group includes overproduced ICs, and unauthorized production of an IC

















































Figure 2.3: Hardware Trojans Taxonomy [31].
2.3 Backscattering
The backscattering concept has been used to enable RFID tags to transmit information
with very low energy expenditure [30]. A typical RFID system based on backscattering is
illustrated in Fig. 2.4. The data transmission requires the RFID reader to emit a continuous
wave (an RF signal at some frequency fc) toward the RFID tag. The RFID tag contains
an antenna that can be connected to one of two impedances, Z0 or Z1, one of which is
chosen to maximize the antenna’s reflection coefficient (also called radar cross-section, or
RCS) for frequency fc, while the other impedance is chosen to minimize the antenna’s RCS
for fc. The RFID tag typically contains an application-specific integrated circuit (ASIC)
chip that can electronically switch the antenna’s connection between these two impedances,
which modulates the signal that reflects (backscatters) from the antenna according to the
data bits the RFID tag wishes to transmit. The RFID reader then receives and demodulates
the backscattered signal to retrieve the data transmitted by the tag. This enables use of very
compact RFID tags, because the energy for the signal “transmitted” by the RFID tag is
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Figure 2.4: An illustration of backscatter data communication.
2.4 Traditional Analog Side-Channels
2.4.1 EM Side-Channels
In EM side-channels, the variation in the current-flow in a device while it is in operation
causes the device to emit EM waves [99]. An advantage of EM side-channels is that they
have a large bandwidth. Furthermore, they allow an attacker to monitor the device from a
distance; however, the range is limited by the magnitude of the radiation. Since the strength
of the radiation is a consequence of the physical properties of the device, the attacker has
little control over it. As a result, the difficulty of monitoring the EM side-channel can vary
greatly between different types of devices and programs.
2.4.2 Power Side-Channels
In power side-channels, information about what is being performed by a device can be ob-
tained by monitoring how its power consumption varies. Because some power is consumed
by a transistor while it is active, the device’s power draw is directly related to its transistors’
1Typically the electronic switching done by the RFID tag’s ASIC is powered by energy-harvesting using
the reader’s signal, which completely eliminates the need for long-term energy storage (e.g. a battery) in the
RFID tag.
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activity [100]. One weakness of power side-channels is that they require a direct connec-
tion to the monitored device. Furthermore, power side-channels have a limited bandwidth
[24] because the on-chip mechanisms that limit the supply voltage fluctuations also act as a




CREATING A BACKSCATTERING SIDE-CHANNEL TO ENABLE DETECTION
OF DORMANT HARDWARE TROJANS
3.1 Overview
As discussed in Chapter 1, HT detection through side-channel analysis is the most effec-
tive and widely used HT detection approach. Among side-channel-based HT detection ap-
proaches, external-measurement side-channel techniques are generally preferred because
they require no modifications to the IC itself, which means there is no degrade on chip size,
manufacturing cost, performance, and power. Since a HT is typically much smaller than
the original circuit, an ideal side-channel signal would have little noise and interference so
that the HT’s small contribution to the signal is not obscured by the noise. Additionally, the
HT’s payload is largely inert until activated, and activation during measurement is highly
unlikely, so ideally the side-channel signal would be affected by the presence of the payload
circuitry, even when it is inert. Finally, before activation, what little switching activity the
HT does create is in its trigger component, which usually has only brief bursts of switching
when the inputs it is monitoring change. Thus an ideal side-channel signal would have high
bandwidth, such that these brief bursts of current fluctuation due to switching activity in
the HT can be identified.
Unfortunately, as mentioned earlier, existing externally-measurable side-channel sig-
nals, such as temperature, voltage, power supply current, and electromagnetic emana-
tions [22], tend to vary mostly in response to current variation due to switching activity.
However, temperature changes slowly and has very limited bandwidth, and voltage and
supply current have low bandwidth [24] because on-chip capacitances that help limit sup-
ply voltage fluctuation act as a low-pass filter with respect to both current and voltage as
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seen from outside the chip. Electromagnetic emanations can have high bandwidth, but their
signal-to-noise ratio is affected by noise and interference.
Motivated by the above-mentioned drawbacks of previous techniques, this work intro-
duces a new physical side-channel, i.e., the backscattering side-channel, that is created by
transmitting a signal toward the IC, where the internal impedance changes caused by on-
chip switching activity modulate the signal that is backscattered (reflected) from the IC.
To demonstrate how this new side-channel can be used to detect small changes in circuit
impedances, we use it to implement a new proof-of-concept method for non-destructively
detecting HTs from outside of the chip.
We test our new HT detection technique using multiple HTs from the Trusthub bench-
mark [31] and show that it is highly accurate in detecting even inactive HTs while avoiding
false positives. We compare our approach to one that applies the same signal analysis
to traditional electromagnetic emanations, and our results confirm backscattering yields a
dramatic improvement in HT detection accuracy. We further evaluate the sensitivity of
our approach by separately reducing the size of the HT’s trigger and payload components,
and showing that HT detection of inactive HTs largely depends on the size of the trigger
component, and that our approach can detect even HTs with significantly reduced triggers.
Additionally, we also evaluate how our approach is affected by manufacturing and other
variations, by using different physical instances of the same design for training and testing,
and find that the technique largely maintains its ability to detect HTs accurately even when
trained on only one instance and used to test another.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 introduces the hypothesis
and proof of existence of the backscattering side-channel. Section 3.3 summarizes the
advantages of the new backscattering side-channel, compared with existing traditional side-
channels. Section 3.4 presents a proof of how hardware Trojan can be detected by using
the backscattering side-channel. Section 3.5 defines our detection technique and algorithm,
while Section 3.6 describes the Trojans we use, how we implement those hardware Trojans
24
on a FPGA, and the measurement setup. Section 3.7 evaluates the effectiveness of our
technique in cross-training scenarios, how the size and position of HT’s trigger and payload
affect detection accuracy, and the difference in HT detection when the Trojans are dormant
versus when the Trojans are activated. Section 3.8 further evaluates the robustness of the
technique, by testing it on multiple boards with multiple HT designs. Finally, Section 3.9
concludes this chapter.
3.2 Exploiting Backscattering as a New Physical Side-Channel
The motivation to explore backscattering as a side-channel was a hypothesis that the backscat-
ter radio effect should be present in electronic devices. Specifically, transistors in digital
circuits switch between two states (closed and open), which changes the impedances con-
nected to wires within the IC, which should modulate a signal that is backscattered from
the IC. An example of this is shown in Fig. 3.1 for a CMOS NOT gate, which consists
of two pull-up transistors connected in parallel and two pull-down transistors connected in
series, as shown in Fig. 3.1 (a).
Depending on its output (logical 1 or logical 0), the NOT gate exhibits two impedance
states shown in Fig. 3.1, where R1 is the resistance of the in-parallel connection of con-
ducting (turned-on) pull-up transistors, while R0 is the in-series connection of conducting
(turned-on) pull-down transistors. Thus the impedances “seen” from the gate’s VDD and
ground connections change depending on the output state of this gate, and unless the tran-
sistor geometry and doping levels are perfectly chosen to make R1 and R0 be exactly the
same, the impedances “seen” from the gate’s output will also change with the gate’s output
state [101]. Furthermore, actual impedances also have parasitic capacitances and induc-
tances that depend on the exact geometry of the gate and its connections, making it highly
likely that the overall impedances change with the gate’s output state.
Other types of gates exhibit similar state-dependent impedance changes, so when a
continuous-wave signal is transmitted toward a set of gates, the backscattered signal can
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be expected to change as the gates’ states change, thus creating an impedance-based side-
channel, in contrast to the traditional EM side-channel which is current-flow based.
 (a) (b) (c) 
Input Output Output Output 
Z1 
Z2 
Figure 3.1: CMOS NOT gate (a) and its two equivalent impedance circuits (b).
To illustrate how this concept works in practice, The author implements a ring of flip-
flops as shown in Fig. 3.2 in an Altera DE0 board with a Cyclone V FPGA. The flip-flops
are initialized with alternating values, such that each flip-flip toggles from 0 and 1 and back
again with a frequency of fm. Fig. 3.3 shows the resulting output voltage of a flip-flop in















Figure 3.2: Cyclical shift register.
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Figure 3.3: Measured voltage at the output of flip-flops switching at fm=900 kHz.
A continuous wave (sinusoidal) signal at frequency fcarrier is transmitted toward the
FPGA chip, and receive the backscattered signal using the same setup as in Fig. 3.9.
The backscattered signal, if it is modulated by the switching activity, should contain not
only a component at fcarrier, but also side-band components at frequencies fcarrier−fm and
fcarrier + fm. The fcarrier=3.031 GHz in this experiment was chosen to avoid interference
from other periodic signals on the DE0-CV board, e.g. the crystal-oscillator-controlled 50
MHz clock and its harmonics. To ensure that the side-channel created by the backscattering
effect corresponds to on-chip activity, none of the flip-flop outputs is used to control any off-
chip activity, and all of the FPGA chip’s output pins are kept in a constant state throughout
the experiment.
Fig. 3.4 plots the spectra of the backscattered signal in this experiment. The first spec-
trum was collected for fm=900 kHz. This spectrum contains a strong component at fcarrier,
which represents the unmodulated part of the backscattered (reflected) signal, and also side-
band signals 900 kHz to the left and to the right of fcarrier. These side-band signals are a
consequence of the carrier signal being modulated by on-chip toggling activity through the
backscattering effect. To further increase confidence that these side-band signals are indeed
a consequence of the backscattered signal being modulated by on-chip toggling, we change
the fm to 1.2 MHz, and observe that the spectral component at fcarrier remains at the same
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frequency, the frequencies of side-band components change with fm as predicted by the
modulation hypothesis (sidebands at fcarrier±fm).
 
Figure 3.4: Measured backscatter power with fcarrier=3.031 GHz and fm=900 kHz (blue),
1.2 MHz (red), respectively.
Note that these measurements were conducted in an indoor office environment, in the
presence of measurement instruments, LCD monitors, mobile phones, WiFi routers, etc.
that all create interference at various frequencies. While this can be a problem for measure-
ments using the traditional electromagnetic side-channel, where some of the interference
may be in the same frequency bands in which the chip produces side-channel emanations,
with the backscattering side-channel such interference can be avoided by selecting fcarrier
such that no strong interference is present in a wide frequency band around it. Finally,
please note that signal injected into the board is well below levels that may cause faults
(whether transient or permanent) on the FPGA chip or elsewhere on the board.
3.3 The Advantages of Backscattering Side-Channel
Unlike other analog side-channels such as electromagnetic emanation (EM) and power,
which are a consequence of current-flow changes inside the chip, backscattering side-
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channel is an impedance-based side-channel that is the consequence of impedance switch-
ing activities inside the chip. These channels can be created by propagating a continuous-
wave signal toward the chip. The transistor switching activities cause changes in the
chip impedance, which modifies the radar cross-section (RCS) of the circuit. This RCS
change modulates the signal that is backscattered (reflected) from the chip, which creates
an impedance-based backscattering side-channel. If hardware Trojan is added to a circuit,
it changes the impedance of the circuit even if the Trojan is not activated. The changes will
be reflected in the backscattered signal, which is beneficial to the detection of hardware
Trojan.
The backscattering side-channel has several advantages compared to other side-channels
such as EM and power. These advantages can be listed as follows:
• High bandwidth: This provides the capability of detecting small and fast switching
Trojan activities.
• Signal strength not limited by leakage from devices: One characteristic that sets the
backscattering side-channel aside from others is that its signal strength can be im-
proved by increasing the carrier’s input power. As a result, the backscattering side-
channel can still work when there is very little leakage from devices.
• Adaptable frequency: By changing the carrier frequency, we can change the work-
ing frequency of the backscattering side-channel. This helps to increase the signal-
to-noise ratio by shifting the frequency to avoid interrupts that might distract the
changes caused by HT activities.
3.4 Hardware Trojan Detection Using The New Backscattering Side-Channel
Switching in digital circuits causes internal impedances to vary, which causes changes in
the circuit’s radar cross-section (RCS), and thus modulates the carrier wave that is backscat-
tered by the circuit. This new side-channel is impedance-based, so it can be beneficial to
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detection of HTs because the HTs added circuitry, and also the additional connections at-
tached to existing circuitry, result in modifications to the chip’s RCS and in how that RCS
changes as the on-chip circuits switch. Note that although the HT’s trigger tends to be
small, it exhibits switching activity as its logic reacts to inputs from the original circuitry,
and it adds connections to the chip’s original circuitry to obtain those inputs.
Most digital logic circuits are synchronous, so the overall switching pattern follows
the clock cycle. Furthermore, the clock cycle usually accommodates switching delays
along entire paths of logic gates, which means that the impedance changes of individual
gates occur abruptly at some point in the clock cycle, i.e., they have a square-wave-like
waveform. This implies that the backscattered signal will contain side-band components
for several harmonics of the circuit’s clock frequency fC . These side-band components
will be at fcarrier±fC , fcarrier±2fC , fcarrier±3fC , etc., and the components at fcarrier±fC
(that correspond to the first harmonic of the clock frequency) will mostly follow the overall
RCS change during a cycle, while the components for the remaining harmonics will be
influenced by the rapidity (rise/fall times) and timing of the impedance changes within the
clock cycle.
Therefore, The detection of HTs using the backscattering side-channel will rely on
measuring the amplitude of the backscattered signal at fcarrier±fC , fcarrier±2 ∗ fC , ...,
fcarrier±m ∗ fC , i.e. the side-bands for the first m harmonics of the clock frequency. Only
the amplitude is used (i.e. the signal’s phase and other properties are ignored), mainly
because the amplitude at some desired frequency is relatively easy to measure, whereas
the phase and other properties require much more sophisticated tuning, phase tracking, etc.
Furthermore, please note that each clock harmonic produces two side-band components
that have the same amplitude, so the measurement can be made more efficient by only
measuring m points to the left, or m points to the right, of fcarrier. In this work, the author
measures points to the right of the carrier, i.e. fcarrier + fC , fcarrier + 2fC , etc.
Let call the m amplitudes measured for a given circuit a trace, and each trace char-
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acterizes the circuit’s overall amount, timing, and duration of impedance-change activity
during a clock cycle. Intuitively, HTs can then be detected by first collecting training traces,
using one or more ICs that are known to be HT-free, and then HT detection on other ICs
would consist of collecting their traces and checking if they are too different from the traces
learned in training.
However, the amplitude of a received signal declines rapidly with distance. The mea-
surements are performed close to the chip, so even small variations in positioning of the
probes create significant amplitude changes, and would result in numerous false positives
when training and detection are not using identical probe positioning (which is very hard
to achieve in practice).
Fortunately, the distance affects all of the points in a trace similarly, i.e. distance atten-
uates all amplitudes in the trace by the same multiplicative factor. Therefore, rather than
using amplitudes for trace comparisons, The author uses amplitude ratios, i.e. amplitude
of a harmonic divided by the amplitude of the previous harmonic1, which cancels out the
trace’s distance-dependent attenuation factor. The resultingm−1 amplitude ratios are then
used for comparing traces.
To illustrate amplitude ratios and how they are affected by differences in the tests cir-
cuit, Fig. 3.5 shows the statistics (mean and standard-deviation error bars) of each amplitude-
ratio point, for a genuine AES circuit [31], and for the same AES circuit to which the T1800
Trojan from TrustHub [102] has been added but remains inactive throughout the measure-
ment. In this experiment the carrier frequency is fcarrier=3.031 GHz, the AES circuit is
clocked at fC=20 MHz, and amplitudes for m = 35 right-side-band harmonics are mea-
sured to obtain the 34 amplitude ratios shown in Fig. 3.5.
It is observed that different amplitude-ratio points for the same trace vary significantly,
from -30dB to 35dB in Fig. 3.5, and that different measurements for the same amplitude-
1Measurement of signal amplitude are often expressed in decibels, i.e. on a logarithmic scale, and for
these measurements subtraction of logarithmic-scale amplitude values yields the logarithmic-scale value for
the amplitude ratio
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Figure 3.5: Amplitude ratios for HT-free and HT-afflicted AES.
ratio point tend to vary much less than that, making these differences difficult to see in
Fig. 3.5, except for the very large differences between the HT-free and HT-afflicted design
at the 18th and 19th amplitude ratio. This indicates that the impedance change is very small
and the differences can be observed only at higher harmonics of the clock.
To more clearly show the differences at other harmonic-ratio points, Fig. 3.6 shows
amplitude-ratio points that have been normalized to the mean amplitude ratio for the gen-
uine AES circuit, i.e. for each amplitude ratio the logarithmic-scale points are shifted such
that the genuine AES circuit’s mean amplitude ratio becomes zero. It can now be observed
that, in addition to the 18th and 19th point, which exhibit very large differences between
the HT-free and the HT-afflicted measurements, the two circuits differ significantly in a
number of other points, e.g. measurements for the two circuits are fully separable using the
14th point or the 20th point, and numerous other points have very little overlap between
the HT-free and the HT-afflicted sets of measurements.
From Fig. 3.6, it can also be observed that the variance among measurements for the
same design tends to increase with the index of the amplitude-ratio point, i.e., for points that
correspond to higher harmonics. The primary cause of this increased variance is that higher
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Figure 3.6: Amplitude ratios for HT-free and HT-afflicted AES, with each point normalized
to the mean of its HT-free measurements.
harmonics of the signal tend to have lower amplitude, which makes their measurement
less resilient to noise. Another factor that helps explain this increase in variance among
higher harmonics is that they are affected by very small differences in timing of impedance
changes during the clock cycle, and factors such as temperature and power supply voltage
fluctuation can create small changes in the switching speed of the gates, and thus in the
timing of the resulting impedance changes.
Regardless of the reason for the increasing variance among measurements of higher
harmonics, the fact that the variance does increase is an important motivation for using an
impedance-based side-channel rather than one created by bursts of current. Specifically, for
each gate that switches, the impedance change persists for the rest of the cycle, while the
burst of current is very brief in duration. This means that the impedance-change contributes
to lower frequencies than the current-burst signal. When activity from cycle to cycle is
repetitive, the spectrum of the signal’s within-a-cycle waveform is projected onto the har-
monics of the clock frequency, so gate-switching activity tends to affect lower harmonics
of the clock frequency in impedance-based than in current-burst based side-channels. As
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lower harmonics tend to have less variance from measurement to measurement, impedance-
based side-channels can be expected to perform better for HT detection than current-burst
based side-channels, and the results in Section 4.4.2 in Chapter 4 confirm that.
3.5 Hardware Trojan Detection Algorithm
Here, we present the very first HT detection prototype using backscattering side-channel.
Please note that this prototype assumes a “golden” IC (known to be HT-free) can be used
as a reference for training of the HT-detection mechanism. While we realize that this
assumption is often unrealistic for practical deployments of HT detection, we evaluate HT
detection with this assumption because it allows for a fair comparison with another side-
channel (the EM side-channel). Removing the golden-reference assumption would make
the results heavily dependent on the accuracy of the model and the simulator that generates
the reference signals, and different side-channels would require different models/simulators
that would be hard to equalize in accuracy/quality. Thus, we choose to evaluate the new
backscattering side-channel, and to compare it to the EM and power side-channel, under
the same assumptions/conditions, in order to demonstrate the advantages of this new side-
channel, namely that it can detect much smaller circuit modifications, is less susceptible to
manufacturing variability, and can detect dormant HTs. In addition, the assumption makes
it easier to evaluate how changes in the size and position of HT’s trigger and payload affect
the detectability of HTs.
This HT detection prototype has two phases: training, where a circuit that is known to
be HT-free is characterized, and detection, where an unknown circuit is classified into one
of the two categories – HT-free or HT-afflicted, according to how much its measurements
deviate from the statistics learned in training.
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3.5.1 Training
Fig. 3.7 details the training for the prototype implementation of backscattering-based HT
detection. This training consists of measuring K times the signal backscattered from an IC
known to be HT-free, each time collecting the m amplitudes at frequencies that correspond
to the lowest m harmonics of the IC’s clock frequency in the side-band of the received
backscattered signal. Them−1 amplitude ratios are then computed from these amplitudes.
Next, for each of the m − 1 amplitude ratios, the mean and standard deviation across the
M measurements are computed, and the detection threshold for HT detection is computed
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Figure 3.8: Test algorithm.
3.5.2 Detection
Figure 3.8 details how the prototype implementation of backscattering detection decides
whether to classify an IC as HT-free of HT-afflicted. First, a single measurement is obtained
of the m amplitudes that correspond to the lowest m harmonics of the IC’s clock frequency
in the side-band of the signal that is backscattered from the IC under test, and m − 1
amplitude ratios are computed from these amplitudes.
Next, for each of them−1 amplitude ratios, we compute how much it deviates from the
corresponding mean computed during training. This deviation is computed as the absolute
value of the difference, and intuitively it measures how much that amplitude ratio differs
from what would be expected from an HT-free IC. Finally, this sum of these deviations is
compared to the sum of standard deviations from training. Intuitively, the sum of the differ-
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ences for the IC under test is a measure of how much its overall backscattering “signature”
differs from what would be expected from an HT-free IC, and the sum of standard devia-
tions from training corresponds to how much an individual measurement of an HT-free IC
can be expected to differ from the average of HT-free measurements. The IC under test
is labeled as HT-free if its sum of amplitude-ratio deviations is lower than this detection
threshold (sum of standard deviations from training).
3.6 Experimental Setup
3.6.1 Backscattering Side-Channel Measurement Setup
Figure 3.9 shows the measurement setup that we use to evaluate the performance of the
proposed prototype backscattering-based HT-detection. The carrier signal is a sinusoid at
fcarrier=3.031 GHz produced by an Agilent MXG N5183A signal generator and transmit-
ted toward the FPGA chip using an Aaronia E1 electric-field near-field probe. To select
fcarrier, we have measured signal strength at the frequency of the reflected carrier signal
(the signal we were injecting into the board), the first several harmonics of the modulated
FPGA board clock (e.g. 50 MHz away from the carrier), and of the noise floor of the instru-
ment using AARONIA Near Field Probes (0 to 10 GHz). We have found that the side-band
signal for the first harmonic of the board’s clock is strongest when fcarrier is around 3 GHz,
but we have also found that traditional EM emanations create interference at frequencies
that are multiples of the board’s clock frequency (50MHz). Thus, we choose fcarrier=3.031
GHz, a frequency close to 3GHz that avoids interference from the board’s traditional EM
emanation. The device-under-test (DuT) is the FPGA chip on the Altera DE0-CV board,
and it is positioned using a right-angle ruler so that different DE0-CV boards can be tested
using approximately the same position of probes. The backscattered signal is received with
an Aaronia H2 magnetic field near-field probe, and this signal is pre-amplified using an
EMC PBS2 low-noise amplifier and then the signal amplitudes at desired frequencies are








Figure 3.9: Measurement setup for hardware Trojan detection using back-scattering side-
channel.
3.6.2 Training and Testing Circuit Designs
All circuits used in our experiments are implemented on a Field Programmable Gate Array
(FPGA), which allows rapid experimentation by changing the circuit and/or its physical
placement and routing, unlike hard-wired ASIC designs that would require fabrication for
each layout variant of each circuit. The specific FPGA board we use is the Altera DE0-CV
board, and within it, the IC on which our backscattering measurement setup focuses is the
Altera 5CEBA4F23C7N, an FPGA in Altera‘s Cyclone V device family.
For our HT detection experiments, we use AES-T1800, AES-T1600, and AES-T1100
hardware Trojan benchmarks from TrustHub [102]. For all three of these HTs, the original
HT-free design is an AES-128 cryptographic processor, which uses an 11-stage pipeline
to perform the 10 stages of AES encryption on 128-bit block. Since numerous HTs in
the TrustHub repository are similar to each other, we selected these three HT benchmarks
because they exhibit different approaches for their triggers and payloads.
• T1800: The payload in this HT is a cyclic shift register that, upon activation, continu-
ously shifts to increase power drain consumption, which would be a serious problem
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for small battery-powered or energy-harvesting devices in e.g., medical implants.
The HT’s trigger circuit consists of combinatorial logic that monitors the 128-bit
input of the AES circuit, looking for a specific 128-bit plaintext value, and the oc-
currence of that 128-bit value at the input activates the payload. The size of T1800’s
trigger circuit is 0.27% of the original AES circuit, and the size of its payload is
1.51% of the size of the AES circuit. Because this HT’s trigger and payload can be
resized easily, we use this HT to study how our HT detection is affected by HT size
and physical location.
• T1600: The payload in this HT creates activity on an otherwise-unused pin to gen-
erate an RF signal that leaks the key of the AES circuit. The HT’s trigger circuit
consists of sequential logic which activates the payload when a predefined sequence
of values is detected at input of the AES circuit. The size of T1600’s trigger circuit is
0.28% of the size of the original AES circuit, while the size of its payload is 1.76%
of the size of the original AES circuit.
• T1100: The payload of this HT modulates its activity using a spread-spectrum tech-
nique to create a power consumption pattern that leaks the AES key. The trigger is a
(sequential) circuit that looks for a predefined sequence of values at the input of the
AES circuit to activate the payload. The size of T1800’s trigger circuit is 0.28% of
the size of the original AES circuit, while the size of its payload is 1.61% of the size
of the AES circuit.
A key challenge we faced when implementing the HT-afflicted circuits was that these
HTs are specified at the register-transfer level, as modifications to the original AES cir-
cuit’s Verilog HDL source code. If the modified source code is subjected to the normal
compilation, placement, and routing, we found that the addition of the HT causes the EDA
tool to change the placement and routing of most logic elements in the overall circuit, and
this extensive change makes the modification very easy to detect regardless of the HT’s
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(a) (b)
Figure 3.10: (a) Genuine AES circuit (b) Hardware Trojan infected AES circuit.
actual size and activity. The next approach we tried was to compile the AES circuit using
the normal compilation, placement, and routing, and then for each HT-afflicted design we
used the ECO (Engineering Change Order) tool in Altera’s Quartus II suite to add the HT’s
circuitry while leaving unchanged the placement of logic elements (and the routing of their
connections) that belong to the original AES circuit. However, we found that this approach
makes it very hard to place the HT’s logic elements close to the inputs of the original AES
circuit, and (as will be demonstrated in Section 3.7.3), the HT is easier to detect when its
trigger is placed away from where it is connected to the original circuit. To make the HTs
more stealthy, we instead compile, place, and route the HT-afflicted circuit, then create the
HT-free circuit by removing (using the ECO tool) the HT’s logic elements and their con-
nections. To illustrate this, the placement of the HT-free circuit and the T1800-afflicted
circuit are shown in Fig. 3.10, with a zoom-in to show the details where the HT’s logic
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elements are placed.
Finally, for HT detection, the circuit must be supplied with inputs during the evalua-
tion. Since we evaluate our HT detection approach in the dormant-HT scenario, any input
sequence that causes logic gates in the original AES circuit to change state can be used, so
each cycle we simply flip all of the AES circuit’s input bits, as shown in Fig. 3.11.2
 
Figure 3.11: Feeding inputs to the AES circuit.
3.7 Evaluation
3.7.1 Detection of Dormant vs. Active Hardware Trojan Using the Backscattering Side-Channel
Because it is very difficult to activate an HT without a priori knowledge of its trigger con-
ditions, it is highly desirable for an HT detection scheme to provide accurate detection of
dormant HTs, i.e., to detect HTs whose payload is never activated while it is characterized
by the HT detection scheme. However, a dormant HT is typically more difficult to detect
compared to an activated HT. For side-channel-based detection methods, in particular, the
switching activity in the activated payload, and/or the changes it creates in the switching
2Note that hexadecimal 3 and C correspond to binary 0011 and 1100, while hexadecimal A and 5 corre-
spond to 1010 and 0101, respectively. Thus the inputs we feed to the AES circuit simply toggle each of the
input bits, while avoiding all-ones and all-zeros patterns.
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activity of the original circuit, have more impact on the side-channel signal than an in-
ert payload (no switching activity in the payload and no changes to the original circuit’s
functionality).
Figure 3.12 compares the normalized amplitude ratios for an HT-free AES design and
for the same AES design (and layout) to which the AES-T1800 Trojan has been added.
Two separate sets of 20 measurements are shown for the HT-free design, one that is used
for training and one that is used to detect false positives when evaluating HT detection (on
another DE0-CV board). For the HT-afflicted design, one set of 20 measurements is col-
lected when the HT is dormant (its payload has not been activated), and another set of 20
measurements is collected with the same HT after its payload is activated. We can observe
Figure 3.12: Normalized amplitude ratios for backscattering side-channel measurements.
that there are a number of trace points where both sets of HT-afflicted measurements devi-
ate significantly from HT-free measurements, and that this deviation tends to be larger for
measurements in which the HT has been activated. The higher deviation from HT-free mea-
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surements seen for active-HT measurements agrees with the intuitive reasoning that an HT
is easier to detect when active then when it is dormant. Even so, our backscattering-based
HT detection prototype successfully reports the existence in each dormant-HT experiment
(100% detection rate), while correctly reporting all 20 HT-free measurements as HT-free
(no false positives).
3.7.2 Detection of Dormant Hardware Trojan with Cross-Training Using the Backscattering
Side-Channel
Another important practical concern for HT detection is robustness to manufacturing vari-
ations and other differences between different physical instances of the same hardware
design. Thus our evaluation focuses on detection of dormant HTs with cross-training, i.e.,
training for HT detection is performed on one hardware instance, and then HT detection
is performed on others. We evaluate the effectiveness of our HT detection prototype by
training it on one DE0-CV FPGA board with an HT-free AES circuit, then applying HT
detection to several test subject circuits implemented on nine DE0-CV FPGA boards, none
of which is the same as the one used for training. The test subject designs are: Original
AES, AES + Dormant T1800, AES + Dormant T1600, AES + Dormant T1100.
For each measurement, the previously measured FPGA board is removed from the mea-
surement setup, and then a different board is positioned using an angle ruler to model a
realistic measurement scenario when each measurement uses a very similar but not iden-
tical relative position of the chip and the probes. Each test subject design is measured 20
times on each board, and each measurement is used for HT detection in isolation, i.e. for
each test subject the detection makes 20 classification decisions (HT-free or HT-afflicted)
on each of the 9 boards, resulting in a total of 720 decisions. Among these decisions, 180
were on the Original AES test subject, and in all 180 of them our prototype has correctly
classified the design as HT-free, i.e., the HT detection prototype had no false-positive de-
tections. In the remaining 3 sets of 180 decisions, each test subject design was HT-afflicted
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(180 decisions with T1800, 180 decisions with T1600, and 180 with T1100), and in all of
them our prototype has correctly classified the design as HT-afflicted, i.e. the HT detection
prototype has detected the presence of an HT in each measurement in which an HT was
present.
3.7.3 Impact of Trojan Trigger and Payload’s Size and Position on Hardware Trojan
Detection
Impact of Trojan Trigger and Payload’s Size
To provide more insight into which factors influence our HT detection prototype’s ability
to detect dormant HTs, we perform experiments in which we reduce the size of the T1800
hardware Trojan’s trigger and payload. The T1800 was chosen because it has the smallest
trigger among the HTs we used in our experiments, and because both its payload and its
trigger can be meaningfully resized.
Figure 3.13: Normalized amplitude ratios for different sizes of T1800’s trigger input.
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The T1800 monitors the 128-bit data input of the AES-128 circuit, comparing it to a
specific hard-wired 128-bit value, and it activates the payload when that 128-bit value is
detected. In terms of logic elements (gates), the size of this 128-bit trigger is only 0.27%
of the size of the original AES circuit, i.e. even this full-size trigger is much smaller than
the AES circuit to which the HT has been added, and its activity (while the HT is dormant)
is difficult to detect using existing side-channels. We implement reduced-trigger variants
of this HT by monitoring only the 64 least significant bits (the “1/2 Trigger Size” variant,
where the trigger circuit size is only 0.15% of the original AES circuit’s size), and then only
the 32 least significant bits (the “1/4 Trigger Size” variant, where the trigger circuit size is
only 0.08% of the original AES circuit size). The normalized harmonic ratio traces for 20
measurements of each design, along with 40 HT-free measurements (20 for training and
20 for false-positives testing) are shown in Fig. 3.13. We observe that smaller trigger sizes
result in trace points that are closer to HT-free ones, i.e., that trigger size directly impacts
the side-channel-based separation between dormant-HT and HT-free circuits. These results
match the intuition that the HT’s influence on impedance changes should increase as more
input bits are monitored by the HT’s trigger, both because of the increased number of
connections to the original circuit (which can change impedances “seen” by gates that
belong to the original circuit) and because of the increased number of gates whose values
can change (switching activity) within a cycle in the HT’s trigger circuit itself.
The ROC curves for HT detection with different trigger sizes (Fig. 3.14) confirm that,
while the HT with the original-size and even 1/2-size trigger can be detected in each mea-
surement with no false positives, the detection accuracy suffers significantly as the HT’s
trigger is further reduced to 1/4 of the original size.
We perform additional experiments in which we keep the trigger at full size, but reduce
the size of the payload to 50% and then 25%. Our dormant-HT measurement results for
these variants are not noticeably different from each other (Fig. 3.15), which implies that
the payload size has little impact on our HT detection. This agrees with our theoretical and
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Dormant T1800 w/ 1/2 Trigger Size
Dormant T1800 w/ 1/4 Trigger Size
Figure 3.14: ROC curves for HT detection for different sizes of the HT’s trigger circuit.
intuitive expectations: the payload in T1800 has little impact on the impedance changes
during a clock cycle, as it has no switching activity (until activated), and has no connections
to the gates in the original AES circuit (T1800’s payload is designed to produce a lot of
power-draining switching activity upon activation, not to change the functionality of the
AES circuit).
Since the measurements of the full-trigger-and-reduced-payload variants of T1800 HT
are very similar to the full-size T1800 HT, they provide the same ROC curves (complete
detection without false positives) as the full-size T1800 HT, as shown in Fig. 3.14.
Impact of HT Trigger and Payload’s Position
We next investigate how the backscattering-based HT detection is influenced by the physi-
cal location and routing of the HT’s connection to the original circuit. For this, we start with
the AES circuit with the T1800 HT, whose trigger logic was placed at Position 1 shown in
Fig. 3.16 by the placement and routing tool very close to where its 128-bit input can be
connected to the original AES circuit.
We then create a variant of this HT by moving the HT’s trigger logic to Position 2,
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Figure 3.15: Normalized amplitude ratios for different sizes of T1800’s (dormant) payload.
keeping the logic elements and the connections between them in the same position relative
to each other, but making the trigger’s 128 connections to the original AES circuit much
longer. Another variant is similarly created by moving the HT’s trigger logic to Position 3.
The dormant-HT measurement results for these three positions are shown in Fig. 3.17.
We observe that, at many trace points, in terms of separation of HT-afflicted measurements
HT-free ones, Position 2 is significantly more separated than Position 1, and Position 3
provides an additional small increase in separation. This means that HTs placed close to
their connection points in the original circuit are more difficult to detect than HTs that
require long connections. We also performed experiments in which the trigger part of the
HT is kept in Position 1, while its payload was moved to Position 2 and then Position 3.
Our results show that the payload position has little impact on the measurements, which is
as expected given that, in our dormant-HT experiments, the 1-bit “activate” signal between






Figure 3.16: Changing the physical position off the HT’s trigger logic.
payload has no switching activity.
3.8 Further Evaluation of Hardware Trojan Detection Using More Benchmarks
To further evaluate the effectiveness of our HT detection prototype, we implement two
different circuits, RS232 and PIC16F84, each with three HTs, from TrustHub [102]. We
use the same HT detection prototype described in Section 3.5 and the setup described in
Section 3.6.
3.8.1 RS232 circuit
We use RS232-T500, RS232-T600, and RS232-T700 HT benchmarks from TrustHub [102].
For all three of these HTs, the original HT-free design is a RS232 micro-UART core con-
sisting of a transmitter and a receiver. The transmitter takes input words (128-bit length)
and serially outputs each word according to the RS232 standard, while the receiver takes a
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Figure 3.17: Normalized amplitude ratios for different locations of T1800’s trigger logic.
serial input and output 128-bit words.
• RS232-T500: The payload in this HT is a circuit that, upon activation, causes the
transmission to fail. The trigger is sequential circuit that increments its counter every
clock cycle, and activates the payload activated when this counter reaches a certain
value. The size of the trigger circuit is 1.67%, and the size of the payload circuit is
1.48% of the size of the RS232 circuit.
• RS232-T600: The payload in this HT is a circuit that, upon activation, makes the
transmitter’s “ready” signal become stuck-at-1, and changes specific bits in the trans-
mitted data. The trigger is a sequential circuit that looks for a specific sequence of
UART states to activate the payload. The size of the trigger circuit is 1.54%, and the
size of the payload circuit is 1.52% of the size of the RS232 circuit.
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Figure 3.18: Normalized amplitude ratios for different locations of T1800’s (dormant) pay-
load.
• RS232-T700: The payload of this HT is a circuit that, upon activation, makes the
transmitter’s “finished” signal become stuck-at-0. The trigger is sequential circuit
that looks for a predefined sequence of UART states to activate. The size of the
trigger circuit is 1.54%, and the size of the payload circuit is 1.48% of the size of the
RS232 circuit.
The results in Figs. 3.19 and 3.20 show the ratios of harmonics and ROC curve, respec-
tively. The results show that we can detect each of these three Trojans with 100% accuracy
and 0% false positives.
3.8.2 PIC16F84 circuit
We use PIC16F84-T100, PIC16F84-T200, and PIC16F84-T400 hardware Trojan bench-
marks from TrustHub [102]. For all three HTs, the original HT-free design is PIC16F84
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Figure 3.19: Normalized amplitude ratios for different HTs in the RS232 circuit.
circuit, a RISC micro-controller whose functions and instruction set are very similar to
those of the Microchip 16F84 chip.
• PIC16F84-T100: Once activated by its (sequential) trigger circuit, the payload changes
the address to PIC16F84’s program memory (causing denial of service). The size of
the trigger circuit is 1.34%, while the size of the payload circuit is 1.81% of the size
of the PIC16F84 circuit.
• PIC16F84-T200: Once activated by its (sequential) trigger circuit, the payload in
this HT replaces the instruction register with a sleep command (causing denial of
service). The size of the trigger circuit is 1.35%, and the size of the payload circuit
is 1.93% of the size of the PIC16F84 circuit.
• PIC16F84-T400: Once activated by its (sequential) trigger circuit, the payload of
this HT changes the address lines to the external EEPROM to 0 (causing denial of
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RS232 + Dormant T500
RS232 + Dormant T600
RS232 + Dormant T700
Figure 3.20: ROC curves for detection of HTs in the RS232 circuit.
service). The size of the trigger circuit is 1.35%, while the size of the payload circuit
is 1.75% of the size of the PIC16F84 circuit.
The results in Figs. 3.21 and 3.22 show the ratios of harmonics and ROC curve, respec-
tively. The results show that we can detect each of these three Trojans with 100% accuracy
and 0% false positives.
3.8.3 Trigger Size Experiment
As discussed in Section 3.7.3, trigger size has a significant effect on dormant-HT detectabil-
ity. We chose RS232-T500 for this experiment because its trigger consists of monitoring the
executed instruction stream, counting occurrences of a specific instruction until a threshold
value is reached (and then activating the payload). The counter’s size can be changed with-
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out affecting/changing the overall functionality of the HT3. Our reduced-trigger variants of
this Trojan by reducing the number of bit of the counter. We have the following design:
• RS232 + Dormant T500: The size of the trigger is 1.67% of the size of the original
RS232 circuit.
• RS232 + Dormant T500 w/ 1/2 Trigger: The size of the trigger circuit is 1% of the
size of the original RS232 circuit.
• RS232 + Dormant T500 w/ 1/4 Trigger: The size of the trigger circuit is 0.67% of
the size of the original RS232 circuit.
• RS232 + Dormant T500 w/ 1/8 Trigger: The size of the trigger circuit is 0.33%, of
the size of the original RS232 circuit.
For all four of these variants, the payload circuit remains unchanged, and its size is 1.48%
of the original RS232 circuit’s size.
The results in Figs. 3.23 and 3.24 show that the smaller the trigger is, the harder it is to
detect the Trojan, which agrees with our previous results for AES-based HTs.
3.9 Conclusions
This chapter describes a new physical side-channel, i.e., the backscattering side-channel,
that is created by transmitting a signal toward the IC, where the internal impedance changes
caused by on-chip switching activity modulate the signal that is backscattered (reflected)
from the IC. To demonstrate how this new side-channel can be used to detect small changes
in circuit impedances, we propose a new method for non-destructively detecting HTs from
outside of the chip. To our knowledge, this is the first off-chip side-channel technique
capable of detecting inactive HTs while tolerating variations that exist across hardware
3However, the reduced counter size requires the threshold to be reduced, thus activating the payload
sooner and risking detection of the HT during functional and burn-in tests.
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instances. Also, to our knowledge, backscattering has never before been used as a side-
channel signal to infer information about the operation of electronic circuitry, even though
backscattering has been used extensively for RFID tags and other short-range communica-
tions [30].
We experimentally confirm, using measurements on one physical instance for training
and nine other physical instances for testing, that the new side-channel, when combined
with an HT detection method, allows detection of a dormant HT in 100% of the HT-afflicted
measurements for a number of different HTs, while producing no false positives in HT-
free measurements. Furthermore, additional experiments are conducted to compare the
backscattering-based detection to one that uses the traditional EM-emanation-based side-
channel. These results show that backscattering-based detection outperforms the EM side-
channel, confirm that dormant HTs are much more difficult for detection than HTs that have
been activated, and show how detection is affected by changing the HT’s size and physical
location on the IC.
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Figure 3.21: Normalized amplitude ratios for different Trojans on PIC16F84 circuit.















PIC16F84 + Dormant T100
PIC16F84 + Dormant T200
PIC16F84 + Dormant T400
Figure 3.22: ROC curves for different Trojans on PIC16F84 circuit.
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Figure 3.23: Normalized amplitude ratios for different trigger size of RS232 benchmarks.














e RS232 + Dormant T500
RS232 + Dormant T500 w/ 1/2 Trigger Size
RS232 + Dormant T500 w/ 1/4 Trigger Size
RS232 + Dormant T500 w/ 1/8 Trigger Size
Figure 3.24: ROC curves for different trigger size of RS232 benchmarks.
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CHAPTER 4
A COMPARISON OF BACKSCATTERING, EM, AND POWER
SIDE-CHANNELS AND THEIR PERFORMANCE IN DETECTING SOFTWARE
AND HARDWARE INTRUSIONS
4.1 Overview
As we discussed in Chapter 1, side-channel analysis is a powerful tool from both an at-
tacker’s and defender’s perspective. Attackers use side-channels to circumvent traditional
access controls and protections by exploiting the observable side effects of computation
rather than attacking the computation’s functionality. Defenders use side-channels for
tracking program activities on various code levels such as loops, paths, basic blocks, and
individual instructions, as well as for hardware Trojan detection. Understanding similari-
ties and differences among types of side-channels is a necessary step in better utilization
of side-channels. Therefore, to address this problem, we model and quantitatively com-
pare the backscattering, EM, and power side-channels and their performance in detecting
malware and HTs.
We start by describing the backscattering side-channel and comparing it with EM and
power side-channels, two of the more widely used types of side-channels. Then, we char-
acterize, model, and compare spectral characteristics of all three side-channels. Finally, we
compare the performance of all three side-channels in detecting malware and HTs. The
results show that for larger changes in the signals, such as those caused by malware intru-
sions, all three side-channels perform similarly. However, when smaller changes need to
be observed, such as those caused by HTs, the backscattering side-channel outperforms the
EM and power side-channels.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 details the proposed signal
57
models for each side-channel, and verifies them against measurements. Section 4.3 com-
pares how each side-channel’s signal changes with different measurement parameters, such
as distance and input power. Section 4.4 illustrates how malware and HT can be detected
using each side-channel and compares their performance. Finally, Section 4.5 concludes
the chapter.
4.2 Side-Channel Waveform Model Comparison
This section characterizes the three side-channels by proposing a waveform model and
comparing it to the measurement results. The backscattering side-channel is a consequence
of the impedance changes in digital circuits, which are caused by the transistors’ two-state
impedances reflecting a modulated signal. For each gate that switches, the impedance
change persists for the rest of the cycle. As a result, the impedance switching causing
the backscattering side-channel occurs in discrete steps, creating a signal similar to square
pulse wave. However, the EM and power are consequences of the variation of the current
flow in a circuit. As a gate switches, the current will be charged or discharged quickly,
which means the current flow is a burst of current in brief duration. This burst of current
does not persist for the rest of the cycle, and the duration is not the same from cycle to
cycle. Therefore, this current change creates a signal whose amplitude and pulse width
vary every cycle.
Starting with the backscattering side-channel, we change the duty cycle of the toggling
circuit and measure the side-channel signal in frequency domain. As shown in Section
3.2 in Chapter 3, the switching activities of the toggling circuit create peaks at multiple
harmonics of the toggling circuit’s switching frequency in the measured side-channel sig-
nal. We then extract the first three harmonics and compare the shape of these harmonics
with the shape of the first three harmonics of an ideal square pulse produced by simulation.
Similarly, the shape of the first three harmonics when using EM and power side-channels
are compared to those obtained through simulation. Finally, we compare the shape of the
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Figure 4.1: (a) The measurement setup for the backscattering and EM side-channels; (b)
the measurement setup for the power side-channel.
first three harmonics obtained by backscattering, EM, and power measurement of the same
circuits, respectively.
The measurement setup for the backscattering side-channel is shown in Fig. 4.1 (a).
The setup includes a transmitter probe connected to a signal generator and a receiver probe
connected to a vector signal analyzer. Both near-field probes are from the AARONIA Near
Field Probe Set [103]. An Agilent MXG N5183A Signal Generator with an output power
of 15 dBm is used as a signal source and an Agilent MXA N9020A Vector Signal Analyzer
is used to record the signals. Note that both the signal generator and signal analyzer can be
substituted by a single software defined radio (SDR) that has both transmitter and receiver.
The devices under test (DUT) are Altera DE0 Cyclone V FPGA development boards. An
angle ruler is used to position the FPGA boards and a laptop is used to control the devices
and automate the measurements. The EM emanations are recorded by using the receiver
probe in Fig. 4.1 (a). For the power measurements, the power signal is collected using an
N7020 Power Rail Probe PBS2 [104] positioned on a capacitor in the chip, as shown in
Fig. 4.1 (b).
As discussed in the Section 3.2 in Chapter 3, the toggling circuit toggles an array of
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flip-flops between output-on (1) and output-off (0) states. When a flip-flop is turned on
(1-state), its pull-up circuits are closed (conductive) and its pull-down circuits are open
(high impedance). Conversely, when a flip-flop is turned off (0-state), its pull-up circuits
are open and its pull-down circuits are closed. Because the impedances of the pull-up and
pull-down circuits are not identical, the equivalent impedance of the circuit when flip-flops
are in the 1-state is different from the impedance when flip-flops are in the 0-state. There-
fore, the toggling circuit is switching between two different impedance levels at a particular
frequency. The carrier signal is modulated by this difference in impedance levels, creating
the sideband at the switching frequency from the carrier in the backscattered signal. There-
fore, we can model the toggling-modulated backscattering signal as a sinusoidal carrier
waveform modulated by a square-wave waveform that has a 0.5 duty cycle.
We generated an ideal square wave in MATLAB. By varying the duty cycle of this
square pulse train and recording the magnitudes of the first three harmonics, we obtain the
function of how the harmonics change with the duty cycle, as shown in Fig. 4.2. Note that
when the duty cycle is 0.5, the amplitude of the second harmonic drops very low; therefore,
it is not shown in the figure.
We compare this model with the measurements produced by the toggling circuit with
the same toggling frequency that was used in the square-wave model. Furthermore, we
change the duty cycle and record the power of different harmonics to verify that their
measured shapes match the model’s predictions when the duty cycle of the modulating
square-wave signal is changed. Fig. 4.3 shows how each of the first, second, and third har-
monics change with the duty cycle. These results are very similar to those predicted by the
ideal-square-wave model in Fig. 4.2.
Next, we provide signal model for the EM and power side-channels and then compare
the model’s predictions with measurements. In the analysis, we use the same toggling
circuit that was used for the backscattering side-channel.
Here, the current magnitude and pulse width depend on the number of flip-flops that
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Figure 4.2: Changes in the first three harmonics of a modeled ideal square pulse as a
function of duty cycle.
are active during each clock cycle. Since the current’s amplitude and pulse width vary
every cycle, the EM and power side-channels signals’ amplitude and pulse width change
every cycle. Therefore, the side-channel signal can be modeled as a waveform that has
a varying amplitude and pulse width, as shown in Fig. 4.4. The first three harmonics of
this pulse train and how they change with the duty cycle are shown in Fig. 4.5. To verify
this model, we again use the toggling circuit switching at fm = 1.25 MHz. We vary the
duty cycle of the toggling circuit and record the first three harmonics of the EM and power
side-channel signals. The results are shown in Figs. 4.6 and 4.7, respectively. The results
demonstrate that the EM and power side-channels have very similar harmonic amplitude
trends and follow the behavior of the model in Fig. 4.5. On the other hand, these trends are
different from the backscattering side-channel’s results in Fig. 4.3, demonstrating that the
backscattering side-channel is different from the EM and power side-channels.
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Figure 4.3: The first three harmonics of the measured backscattered signal as a function of
duty cycle.
4.3 Comparison of the Characteristics of the Backscattering, EM, and Power Side-
Channels
4.3.1 Impact of Distance on the Side-Channels
While the power side-channel can not be measured from a distance, both the backscattered
and EM signals can be recorded from several meters away. The longer the distance, the
weaker the signal is in both side-channels. However, the backscattering side-channel sig-
nal’s strength can be increased by increasing the power of the carrier wave. This allows for
measurements over a longer distance.
In this section, we analyze how the magnitudes of the backscattering and EM side-
channels’ signals depend on the distance from the monitored device. Because it requires
measuring from a distance, the near-field probes in Fig. 4.1 are replaced by horn antennas
with an average gain of 9.1 dBi [105], as illustrated in Fig. 4.8. The toggling circuit with
a toggling frequency fm = 900 kHz is used and the distance from the antennas to the DUT
is swept from 50 cm to 3 m. The carrier frequency is 10.91 GHz because it does not in-
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Figure 4.4: Waveform model of the EM and power side-channels signal.
terfere with other periodic signals on the DUT, and the horn antennas give high gain at the
frequency. We measure the power of the first harmonic sideband caused by the toggling
circuit. The power of the carrier is kept at 15 dBm, the maximum power that the signal
generator can generate. The results in Fig. 4.9 demonstrate how the magnitudes of the
backscattering and EM side-channel power (in dB) change with the distance. Unsurpris-
ingly, signal strength decays rapidly with the distance in both cases.
4.3.2 Impact of Carrier Input Power on the Side-Channels
For the EM and power side-channels, the strength of measured signal is limited by the
strength of the signal leaked from the device. In contrast, the backscattering side-channel
does not have this limitation since it does not depend on leakage from the circuits. In this
section, the impact of carrier input power on the quality of the backscattering side-channel
is analyzed. In this measurement, the toggling circuit has fm = 1.25 MHz, and the power
of the carrier is swept from -15 dBm to 3 dBm. The results in Fig. 4.10 show that the
sideband power increases as the transmitted carrier power increases. This means that we
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Figure 4.5: The change in the first three harmonics of a modeled current pulse as a function
of duty cycle.
can control the strength of the backscattered signal by changing the power at the carrier’s
transmitter. For example, when measuring far away from the device, or when there are
obstacles between the antenna and the device, we can compensate for the path loss by
transmitting a stronger carrier. Therefore, unlike the EM and power side-channels, the
backscattering side-channel is an “active” side-channel.
4.4 Comparison of the Backscattering, EM, and Power Side-Channels in Detecting
Software and Hardware Intrusions
4.4.1 Comparison of Backscattering-Based, EM-Based, and Power-Based Software Malware
Detection
In this section, we use the EM-Based Detection of Deviations in Program Execution (ED-
DIE) technique, a malware detection prototype from [53], to demonstrate how these side-
channels can be used to detect malware, and then compare their performance. EDDIE is a
novel method for monitoring software activity without paying any overhead on hardware,
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Figure 4.6: The first three harmonics of the measured EM side-channel signal as a function
of duty cycle.
software, and resources on the monitored system [53]. In [53], the authors only exploit the
EM side-channel for EDDIE without considering any other side-channel. In this paper, we
use the EDDIE method for all three side-channels and make a comparison. Note that this
study is intended only as a comparison, and that a much more detailed study of EDDIE’s
EM-based performance can be found in [53].
EDDIE relies on spikes, or peaks, in the frequency spectrum generated by periodic
activity, such as a loop in a software program, to monitor and detect malicious behavior.
As discussed in [53], loops tend to produce peaks in the spectrum that correspond to their
per-iteration timing. These peaks are strongest when an existing periodic signal, such as a
clock signal, is amplitude (AM) modulated by changes in processor activity. For example,
Fig. 4.11 illustrates a spectrum of the AM modulated loop activity of a software program.
In the figure, the center peak, the strongest peak, is the clock signal. The loop’s per-iteration
execution time is approximately T ≈ 20.8 µs. The spectrum shows that there are peaks at
the frequency of f = 1/T ≈ 48 kHz and its harmonics from the center clock signal. These
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Figure 4.7: The first three harmonics of the measured power side-channel signal as a func-
tion of duty cycle.
peaks appear when the loop starts and disappear when the loop ends.
EDDIE takes the time-domain signal and converts this signal into a sequence of spectra
using the Short-Term Fourier Transform (STFT), as shown in Fig. 4.19. Fig. 4.19 shows a
spectrogram of a program consisting of seven loops. A spectrogram is a visual represen-
tation of the spectrum of frequencies of a signal as it varies with time. The x-axis is the
frequency domain, and the y-axis is the time domain. In the figure, the seven sets of peaks
correspond to the seven loops in the program. They appear in chronological order (loop 1
to loop 7) from the top to the bottom of the spectrogram.
EDDIE includes two phases: training and testing, as illustrated in Fig. 4.12. In the
training phase, EDDIE first analyzes the program to identify the loops, inter-loop regions,
and their orders. This is done in LLVM (Low-Level Virtual Machine) compiler by adding a
pass which builds the loop-level control flow graph. Then, it collects a set of side-channel
traces while the program runs multiple times to create a “golden” set of traces. In this







Device under  
test 
Figure 4.8: Setup for the backscattering and EM measurements from a distance.
each trace into a series of sample spectra, in which each spectral sample corresponds to a 1
ms window of time with 75% overlap with the previous sample. Then, it categorizes each
spectral sample as belonging to a particular part of the program. For example, a run for a
program comprised of 7 loops executed will have 9 spectral sample categories: One for the
execution before the first loop, seven for the seven loops, six for inter-loop transitions, and
one for execution after the last loop. After categorizing, EDDIE extracts the peak features
for each spectral sample in each category.
In the testing phase, EDDIE collects the side-channel signal traces while the program
is running, converts the signal into a series of sample spectra, extracts the peak features
from these spectral samples, and then uses the Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S) test to decide,
at a certain level of confidence, how unlikely the testing samples belong to the same dis-
tribution as the training samples. If there is high enough confidence, EDDIE flags it as
malware-infected. An important parameter in the EDDIE’s K-S test is the number of time-
consecutive samples that will be tested in each test. If the number is small, the K-S test
only needs a small set of time-consecutive samples to give a decision, hence the detection
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Figure 4.9: Side-channel power as a function of the distance from the DUT.
latency is low but the detection accuracy is also low. On the other hand, when the number
increases, the detection accuracy increases but the latency also increases. For a given ap-
plication and side-channel, the number of consecutive samples (ns) needed for K-S test can
be found during training by incrementally increasing it until getting zero false positive.
EDDIE’s algorithm starts with taking the first ns spectral samples of the tested signal
and testing it against the training samples and continues to do so (by adding a new sample
and removing the oldest one) until the test does not pass (malicious activity reported) or all
spectral samples of the tested signal have been used.
Measurement Setup
Malware can be injected to attack a software anytime the software is executed. Because it
is not always possible to get close to the device when it is running, it is highly desirable for









Figure 4.10: The received power of the backscattered signal as a function of the carrier
power at the transmitter.
Therefore, we use horn antennas [105] to demonstrate the ability to perform EDDIE from
a distance for both the backscattering and EM side-channels. For the power side-channel,
it is not possible to extract information from a distance; therefore, we use a power probe
placed on the device for the measurements.
The setup for the backscattering side-channel is shown in Fig. 4.8. The setup includes
a transmitter horn antenna connected to a signal generator (for the carrier signal), and a
receiver horn antenna connected to a spectrum analyzer that analyzes the received signal.
Both antennas are placed 15 cm from the DUT. For the EM side-channel, the EM emana-
tions are recorded using the receiver horn antenna in Fig. 4.8. For the power side-channel,
the power signal is collected by using the setup shown in Fig. 4.1 (b), which is described in
Section 4.2. The DUT is, again, an Altera DE0 Cyclone V FPGA development board. For
each experiment, the FPGA implements a Nios-II soft processor.
Compared to the EM and power side-channels, the backscattering side-channel needs a
transmitter. However, by using SDRs, except for an extra antenna, the setup overhead for
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Figure 4.11: The spectrum of a loop structure in a software program.
the backscattering side-channel is the same as for EM side-channel.
Regarding stealthiness, compared to the EM and backscattering side-channel, it is more
difficult for the power side-channel to be measured stealthily because power side-channel
signal cannot be obtained from distance. Both EM and backscattering side-channel mea-
surement can be performed from a distance, but it might be harder for attackers to monitor
the backscattering side-channels stealthily because it needs to transmit a signal toward the
device. However, for defense and intrusion detection purpose, which are the main focus of
this paper, stealthiness is not a concern.
To create test benchmarks, we implemented the bitcount program from MiBench [106],
which consists of seven loops, on the FPGA. The runtimes for loop 1 to 7 are 3,568 ms,
2,632 ms, 3,146 ms, 1,390 ms, 2,250 ms, 2,900 ms, and 2,480 ms, respectively. We
use three different types of malware, which are proof-of-concept implementations of Ran-
somware, DDOS, and Stuxnet-like malware, respectively. Stuxnet-like malware is a class
of malwares that have similar behavior and attack mechanism to the Stuxnet malware. In
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Figure 4.12: Overview of EDDIE.
some conditions. In order to mimic the behavior of Stuxnet-like malwares, we add a small
piece of code to the source code of the program to form a Stuxnet-like attack. The malwares
are injected to the bitcount program between the loops 2 and 3. We also do an experiment
that we inject the Stuxnet-like malware inside the loop 3 of the bitcount program. Intu-
itively, if a malware is injected inside a loop, it will be much easier to detect than ones
outside loops because the malware will affect all the spectral samples created by the loop.
Therefore, when injecting the Stuxnet-like malware inside the loop 3, we reduce its size as
shown in Table 4.1 to make it more meaningful to detect.
Fig. 4.13 shows the spectrogram of loop 2, loop 3, and a loop-to-loop transition region
between loop 2 and loop 3 of a normal (malware-free) bitcount program. As illustrated in
Fig. 4.13, a loop-to-loop transition consists of non-repetitive (non-loop) code that normally
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executes briefly compared to repetitive (loop) regions. This is because modern processors,
even inexpensive ones, are capable of executing hundreds of millions of instructions per
second. As a result, a non-repetitive execution that covers an entire 1 ms window requires
several megabytes of executable code. Typically, a loop-to-loop transition typically lasts
less than one 1 ms spectral sample.
Figs. 4.14-4.16 show spectrograms of loop 2, loop 3, and a loop-to-loop transition re-
gion between loop 2 and loop 3 of a DDOS-infected, Ransomware-infected, and outside-
loop Stuxnet-like malware-infected bitcount program, respectively. The horizontal dashed
lines indicate where the attacks start and end in the spectrogram. The DDOS attack added
975 ms of execution to the program, introducing several additional spectral samples to the
loop-to-loop transition region in the spectrogram. The difference caused by malware be-
tween the malware-infected spectrogram in Fig. 4.14 and normal spectrogram in Fig. 4.13 is
easily identified by human eyes. The execution of Ransomware and outside-loop Stuxnet-
like malware added 3,680 ms, and 92 ms to the execution of the program, respectively.
Fig. 4.17 shows spectrogram of loop 2, loop 3, and a loop-to-loop transition region
between loop 2 and loop 3 of a bitcount program infected by inside-loop Stuxnet-like mal-
ware inside loop 3. The runtime of the inside-loop Stuxnet-like malware is only 0.0039 ms.
However, since it is injected inside loop 3, it affects all the spectral samples created by loop
3. As shown in Fig. 4.17, the malware shifted the peak of loop 3 to a different frequency in
the spectrogram. Table 4.1 summarizes the runtime of all the malwares.
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Figure 4.13: The spectrogram of malware-free bitcount software zoomed in loop 2 and 3.
Evaluation
For each of the three side-channels, we run the genuine bitcount program and record 25
traces of the respective side-channel signal for training. For testing, we first measure 25
traces of the respective side-channel signal when running the genuine bitcount program,
25 traces of the respective side-channel signal when the bitcount program is infected by
DDOS, 25 traces of the respective side-channel signal when the bitcount program is in-
fected by Ransomware, 25 traces of the respective side-channel signal when the bitcount
program is infected by outside-loop Stuxnet-like malware, and 25 traces of the respective
side-channel signal when the bitcount program is infected by inside-loop Stuxnet-like mal-
ware.
The spectrograms in Figs. 4.18-4.20 show that all seven loops in the bitcount program
can be observed (the most visible peak of each loop is highlighted in white) using the









Figure 4.14: The spectrogram of the bitcount program infected by DDOS between loop 2
and 3.
monics for each loop could be different for each side-channel.
EDDIE achieves 100 percent accuracy with zero false positive rates for all three side-
channels and the four malware attacks. This result matches what was reported in [53]. The
detection latency for the bitcount benchmark is 42 ms, which is the same for the backscat-
tering, EM, and power side-channels. Because the variation in the processor activity caused
by the malware is relatively large, the required sampling rate of the side-channels is not very
high. As a result, even though the three side-channels have different sized bandwidths,
they still work well for detecting the malwares. The power side-channel gives the strongest
signal because it was measured by a probe that was contacted directly with the device,
while both the backscattering and EM side-channels were measured by antennas from a
distance. However, as mentioned earlier, the power side-channel does not support moni-











Figure 4.15: The spectrogram of the bitcount program infected by Ransomware between
loop 2 and 3.
meters away. Furthermore, based on the spectrograms, the backscattering side-channel sig-
nals’ loop were weaker than the signal’s measured by the the EM and power side-channels.
However, unlike the other two side-channels, the backscattering signals’ strength can po-
tentially be improved by increasing the transmitted carrier power.
To further evaluate and compare the three side-channels in the context of malware de-
tection, we implement another program based on basicmath benchmark from MiBench
[106], which consists of four loops, on the FPGA. The runtimes for loop 1 to 4 are 1,505
ms, 2,480 ms, 2,143 ms, and 2,592 ms, respectively. We use the same implementation
of DDOS, Ransomware, outside-loop Stuxnet-like malware, inside-loop Stuxnet-like mal-
ware. We inject the first three malwares into the basicmath program between the loops 3
and 4, and the last one inside loop 4 of the basicmath program.
The spectrograms in Figs. 4.21-4.23 show that all four loops in the basicmath program
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Figure 4.16: The spectrogram of the bitcount program infected by outside-loop Stuxnet-
like malware between loop 2 and loop 3.
can be observed (the most visible peak of each loop is highlighted in white) using the
backscattering, EM, and power side-channels, respectively. EDDIE achieves 100 percent
accuracy with zero false positive rates for all three side-channels and the four malware
attacks. The detection latency for the basicmath benchmark is 25 ms, which is the same for
the backscattering, EM, and power side-channels.
4.4.2 Comparison of Backscattering-Based, EM-Based, and Power-Based Hardware Trojan
Detection
Hardware Trojan Detection Method
In this section, we use the method proposed in [64] to compare performance of backscattering-
based, EM-based, and power-based HT detection. This method relies on measuring the
amplitude of the side-channel signal at the sidebands for the first m harmonics of the clock
















Figure 4.17: The spectrogram of the bitcount program infected by inside-loop Stuxnet-like
malware inside loop 3.
the amplitude of the previous harmonic to cancel out the distance dependent attenuation
factor. Note that each clock harmonic produces two sideband components. In [64], the
authors measure points to the right of the carrier, i.e. fcarrier +fc, fcarrier +2∗fc, etc. These
m amplitudes are measured for a given circuit form a trace, and each trace characterizes the
amount, duration, and timing of the circuit’s impedance-changing activity during a clock
cycle. The calculated m − 1 amplitude ratios are then used for comparing traces. By col-
lecting training traces using one or more genuine ICs, it can detect HTs on other ICs by
collecting their traces and comparing them with the training traces. The method consists of
two phases: training and detection.
• Training: The training phase includes measuring the side-channel signal from a gen-
uine IC K times. During each measurement, the amplitudes of the first m harmonics
of the IC’s clock are recorded. The m− 1 amplitude ratios are computed from these
amplitudes. Then, for each ratio, the mean and standard deviation across the K mea-
surements are computed, and the detection threshold for HT detection is computed
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Figure 4.18: The spectrogram of bitcount software received via the backscattering side-
channel.
as the sum of the m− 1 standard deviations.
• Detection: First,m amplitudes are recorded andm−1 amplitude ratios are computed
from these amplitudes for the IC under test. Then, for each of the m − 1 amplitude
ratios, we calculate the absolute difference between it and the corresponding mean
computed during training. Finally, we sum the difference of all m − 1 amplitude
ratios and the sum of these deviations is compared to the sum of standard deviations
from training. The IC under test is labeled as HT-free if its sum of amplitude-ratio
deviations is lower than this detection threshold (the sum of standard deviations from
training).
Measurement Setup
Because HTs cannot be injected after the chip is fabricated, all the chips need to be tested
before selling to customers. It is not necessary to perform HT tests from a distance because
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Figure 4.19: The spectrogram of the bitcount software received via the EM side-channel.
the testing setup can always be placed close to the chips under test. Therefore, for this type
of application, we use near-field probes placed close to the DUT instead of horn antennas
to receive stronger signals. The measurement setup for the backscattering, EM and power
side-channels is shown in Fig. 4.1, which is described in Section 4.2.
To create benchmarks for the experiments, we use the T500 HT design from Trusthub,
the most comprehensive HT benchmark to date [102], on an FPGA. First, we implement
the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) circuit as the host circuit, then we use the ECO
(Engineering Change Order) tool in Altera’s Quartus II suite to add the HT’s circuitry to
the host circuit without changing the placement of logic elements (and the routing of their
connections) that belong to the original AES host circuit. Fig. 4.24 illustrates the placement
of the HT-free circuit and the HT-afflicted circuit with a zoom-in to show the details where
the HT’s logic elements are placed.
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Figure 4.20: The spectrogram of bitcount software received via the power side-channel.
Evaluation
We use the setup in Fig. 4.1 (a) to record the backscattered signal. Fig. 4.25 compares
the normalized amplitude ratios for the HT-free AES design to the same AES design (and
layout) with the AES-T500 Trojan added. We can observe that there are a number of trace
points where both sets of HT-afflicted measurements deviate significantly from HT-free
measurements, and that this deviation tends to be larger for measurements in which the HT
has been activated. The higher deviation from HT-free measurements seen for active-HT
measurements agrees with the intuitive reasoning that a HT is easier to detect when it is
active. Even so, the backscattering-based HT detection prototype successfully reports the
existence in each dormant-HT experiment (100% accuracy), while reporting all HT-free
measurements as HT-free (no false positives).
We repeat the same experiment as in Fig. 4.25 but measure the EM and power side-




Figure 4.21: The spectrogram of basicmath received via the backscattering side-channel.
from these measurements are shown in Fig. 4.26 and Fig. 4.27. In the figures, the HT-
afflicted measurements are much less separated from HT-free ones than they were using the
backscattering side-channel. More importantly, nearly all dormant-HT measurements have
significant overlap with HT-free measurements, making the dormant-HT measurements
difficult to be distinguished from HT-free ones. This is confirmed by the receiver operating
characteristic (ROC) curves shown in Fig. 4.28 which were obtained by running the same
HT detection described in Section 4.4.2 on the measurements from all three side-channels.
As shown in the figure, the backscattering side-channel successfully detects 100% HTs
with 0% false positives. In contrast, the EM side-channel can only detect around 75% of
active-HTs and only 15% of dormant-HTs. The power side-channel performs even worse,
with less than 5% of HTs detected for both dormant and active HTs. This confirms the
backscattering side-channel is more effective for HT detection than traditional EM and




Figure 4.22: The spectrogram of the basicmath received via the EM side-channel.
relatively small. Therefore, the required sampling rate of the side-channels is very high to
be able to detect HTs. As discussed, the power side-channel has a limited bandwidth. While
the EM side-channel may have higher bandwidth compared to the power side-channel,
it is still lower than that of the backscattering. Furthermore, its signal-to-noise ratio is
affected by noise and interference, which results in poor detection accuracy compared to
the backscattering side-channel.
To further evaluate and compare the performance of the three side-channels on HT
detection,we implement two different circuits, PIC16F84 and RS232, and two other HT
designs, PIC16F84-T300 and RS232-T100, from Trusthub [102]. The normalized ampli-
tude ratios from the measurements for PIC16F84 circuit using the backscattering, EM, and
power side-channels are shown in Figs. 4.29, 4.30 and 4.31, respectively. In the figures,
the HT-afflicted measurements are much less separated from HT-free ones for the EM and




Figure 4.23: The spectrogram of basicmath received via the power side-channel.
Fig. 4.32 show that the backscattering side-channel successfully detects 100% HTs with
0% false positives while the EM and power side-channels can only detect around 30% and
less than 5% of dormant PIC16F84-T300, respectively. Figs. 4.33, 4.34 and 4.35 show the
normalized amplitude ratios from the measurements for RS232 circuit using backscatter-
ing, EM, and power side-channels, respectively. The ROC curves in Fig. 4.36 show that
while the EM and power side-channels can only detect around 20% and 15% of dormant
RS232-T100, respectively, the backscattering side-channel successfully detects 100% HTs
with 0% false positives.
4.5 Conclusions
Side-channel analysis is a powerful tool both from attacker’s and from defender’s perspec-
tives. Understanding similarities and differences among a large number of side-channels
is a necessary step in better utilizing them. This chapter addresses this problem by mod-
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Figure 4.24: (a) Genuine AES circuit (b) Hardware Trojan infected AES circuit.
eling and quantitatively comparing the backscattering, EM, and power side-channels and
discussing the performance of these three side-channels in detecting software malware and
HT. The results show that for larger changes in the signals, such as those caused by malware
intrusions, all three side-channels perform similarly. However, when smaller changes need




Figure 4.25: The backscattering side-channel amplitude ratios.
 
Figure 4.26: The EM side-channel amplitude ratios.
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Figure 4.27: The power side-channel amplitude ratios.
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Figure 4.28: ROC curves for the backscattering, EM-based, and power-based HT detection.
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Figure 4.29: The backscattering side-channel amplitude ratios for PIC16F84.
 
Figure 4.30: The EM side-channel amplitude ratios for PIC16F84.
 
Figure 4.31: The power side-channel amplitude ratios for PIC16F84.
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Figure 4.32: Detection performance (ROC curve) comparison of for the backscattering,
EM-based, and power-based HT detection for PIC16F84.
 
Figure 4.33: The backscattering side-channel amplitude ratios for RS232.
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Figure 4.34: The EM side-channel amplitude ratios for RS232.
 
Figure 4.35: The power side-channel amplitude ratios for RS232.
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Figure 4.36: Detection performance (ROC curve) comparison of the backscattering, EM-
based, and power-based HT detection for RS232.
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CHAPTER 5
A NOVEL GOLDEN-CHIP-FREE CLUSTERING TECHNIQUE USING
BACKSCATTERING SIDE-CHANNEL FOR HARDWARE TROJAN
DETECTION
5.1 Overview
As we discussed in Chapter 1, among proposed hardware Trojan detection techniques,
reverse engineering based approaches and side-channel analysis techniques are the most
widely used hardware Trojan detection methods. Reverse engineering based approaches
appear to be the most accurate and reliable ones because they work for all circuits and Tro-
jan types without a golden example of the chip. However, because reverse engineering is
an extremely expensive, time-consuming, and destructive process, it is exceedingly difficult
for these techniques to be applied for a large population of ICs in a real test environment.
On the other hand, the side-channel based techniques can be applied to a large popula-
tion of ICs because side-channel measurements do not require damaging the board while
conducting testing. However, the disadvantage of side-channel techniques is their depen-
dence on either having a “golden” (HT-free) chip, which is not a practical assumption for
foundry-inserted HTs in single-source ICs, or having a detailed simulation model, which is
often impractical (complex ICs, 3rd-party IP, etc.).
To overcome these shortcomings of both types of approaches, this chapter proposes
a novel “golden-chip-free” clustering algorithm using backscattering side-channel. This
technique is bridging the gap between expensive, destructive reverse-engineering and tra-
ditional side-channel detection techniques. The technique requires no golden chip or a
priori knowledge of the chip circuitry. The proposed clustering algorithm clusters a large
population of ICs based on the effect of a hypothetical HT would have on the backscat-
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tering side-channel signal. In practical terms, the technique creates clusters such that the
ICs in each cluster can be considered equivalent in terms of presence or absence of an HT.
This allows reverse-engineering of one IC in each cluster to be used to assess the status (in
terms of HT presence and nature) of that entire cluster. This significantly reduces the size
of test vectors for reverse engineering based detection techniques, thus enables deployment
of reverse engineering approaches to a large population of ICs in a real testing scenario.
The results are collected on 100 different FPGA boards where boards are randomly
chosen to be infected or not. The results show that we can cluster the boards with 100%
accuracy and demonstrate that our technique can tolerate manufacturing variations among
hardware instances to cluster all the boards accurately for 9 different dormant Trojan de-
signs on 3 different benchmark circuits from Trusthub. We have also shown that we can
detect dormant Trojan designs whose trigger size has shrunk to as small as 0.19% of the
original circuit with 100 % accuracy as well.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.3 defines the problem and
attack scenarios. Section 5.4 explains our clustering technique and algorithm, while Section
5.5 describes our experiment setup and testing scheme formulation. Section 5.6 presents
the our results, while Section 5.2 discusses related work. Finally, Section 5.7 concludes the
chapter.
5.2 Related Work
For the past few years as hardware Trojan have emerged as an increasingly dangerous threat
and machine learning has become such a hot topic, a few HT detection techniques utiliz-
ing machine learning for clustering has been proposed. In general, machine learning can
be combined with all above-discussed categories of HT detection method such as reverse
engineering, functional validation, code and gate-level netlist analysis, functional testing,
and side-channel analysis. In [111], the authors exploit support vector machine (SVM)
and K-means clustering approach to provide automatic layout identification in their reverse
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engineering-based detection method. The technique does not rely on a golden sample;
however, because the nature of reverse engineering is extremely cost and time-consuming,
it is not realistic to assume having a large set of data for clustering. The methods in [112,
113] propose low overhead clustering-based detection technique for runtime Trojan de-
tection. However, the methods need golden samples for training, and is only capable of
detecting activated HTs, which is not practical. The authors in [114] propose a technique
using AdaBoost Meta-Learner algorithm based on automatic feature selection using Haar-
like functions to assist reverse engineering detection. However, it also depends on having
golden samples. There are only a few machine learning based techniques which can elimi-
nate the need of golden samples [75, 11, 76]. However, the majority of these are pre-silicon
approaches, which means that they can not detect HTs inserted in the fabrication stage
Over the past few years, a number of HT detection techniques using side-channel anal-
ysis for detecting HTs inserted in the fabrication stage have been proposed. The authors in
[73] propose a novel method to detect hardware Trojans in the fabricated ICs by creating a
backscattering side-channel. The results shows that their method can detect dormant hard-
ware Trojans with 100% accuracy and 0% false positives. However, similar to the majority
of other side-channel techniques, their approach requires having a verified HT-free chip. In
[22], the authors present a method using EM to detect HTs without having a golden circuit
by modeling the benchmark circuits they used for testing. They have simulated the models
to generate EM traces for the circuit and compare them with the measured ones to detect
HTs with no HT-free chip. However, in the paper, the authors only test their technique on
a single FPGA board, thus the hardware manufacturing variation are not verified. Further-
more, they only evaluate their techniques with activated hardware Trojans, which is also
not practical because it is extremely difficult to activate HTs without a priori knowledge
of their circuitry and activation mechanisms. In addition, the technique requires a priori
knowledge of the chip circuitry, heavily depends on the accuracy of the model and the sim-
ulator that generate the reference signals, and might not work for other circuits that are not
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modeled in the paper.
As machine learning has become prevalent over the last decade, a number of papers ex-
ploiting clustering techniques for HT detection have been proposed. In [111], the authors
exploit the support vector machine (SVM) and K-means clustering approach to provide
automatic layout identification in their reverse engineering-based detection method. The
technique does not rely on a golden sample; however, because the nature of reverse engi-
neering is extremely costly and time-consuming, it is not realistic to assume having a large
set of data for clustering. The methods in [112, 113] propose a low overhead clustering-
based detection technique for runtime Trojan detection. However, the methods need golden
samples for training and are only capable of detecting activated HTs. The authors in [114]
propose a technique using the AdaBoost Meta-Learner algorithm based on automatic fea-
ture selection using Haar-like functions to assist in reverse engineering detection. However,
the method also requires to have golden samples.
Only a few clustering techniques can eliminate the need for golden samples [75]-[76].
The authors in [75] present an information-theoretic approach that estimates the statistical
correlation between the signals in a design and then use a weight normalization and cluster-
ing algorithm to detect HTs. In [11], the authors propose COTD, an HT detection technique
based on analyses of the controllability and observability of gate-level netlist and utilizing
an unsupervised clustering to detect HTs by exploiting significant inter-cluster distance
caused by the controllability and observability characteristics of Trojan gates. In [76], the
authors propose a technique based on “outliers”, a procedure to identify suspicious signals
in a netlist, and clustering technique to detect HTs. However, all of these methods are pre-
silicon approaches, which means that they can not detect HTs inserted in the fabrication
stage. A post-silicon clustering technique using side-channel analysis has been proposed in
[77], but authors only test their method on a set of two FPGA, which does not give enough
statistics to evaluate manufacturing variations among different hardware instances. One of
the main challenges of techniques using side-channels with external-measurement is that
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the variation across different hardware instances may cloud the difference causes by hard-
ware Trojans. Therefore, detection accuracy normally decreases dramatically when testing
across multiple hardware instances. In addition, the technique uses power side-channel,
which provides very limited resolution and bandwidth [73]. As a result, the technique only
gives 93.75% accuracy for HT benchmarks from Trusthub, even when testing with only
two different FPGA boards.
5.3 Attack Scenarios and Problem Statement
5.3.1 Attack Scenarios
During the fabrication process at foundries, if an adversary has access to the chip layout
and adds HTs to the design, a part or the entire population of ICs will be injected HTs,
depending on how the ICs are produced. As a result, there are three possible scenarios:
• No adversary: There is no malicious modifications to any chip. Therefore, the entire
population of ICs is HT-free.
• Partial insertion: There are malicious modifications to some of the chips. This hap-
pens when different batches of ICs are fabricated at different chronological phases of
production and the attacker only inserts Trojan at one or some phases. As a result, a
part of the population of ICs have Trojans, while the rest are HT-free.
• Full insertion: Malicious modification exists in all of the chips. This happens when
all ICs are fabricated at once, and the attacker inserts HTs to the chip layout. As a
result, the entire population of ICs will be HT-infected.
5.3.2 Problem Statement
As discussed in Section 5.1, there are two methods for the detection of HTs inserted at
foundries: reverse engineering and side-channel analysis. Side-channel analysis techniques
have advantages of being non-destructive and relatively fast, which are suitable for testing
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a large number of ICs. However, the problem with side-channel techniques is the depen-
dence on either 1) having a “golden” chip (a chip that is a priori known to be HT-free),
which is not a practical assumption if HTs were inserted at foundries, or 2) simulation,
which only works for the specific circuits modeled. These difficulties prevent these tech-
niques from being used without other assisting techniques for HT detection in practice. In
contrast, reverse engineering techniques are highly accurate and need neither simulation
nor a “golden” chip, which allows them to be used for the detection of HTs without any
assisting techniques. However, the problem with these techniques is that the reverse en-
gineering process is extremely expensive, time-consuming, and destructive. Hence, these
techniques could not be deployed for a large population of ICs.
To circumvent the introduced difficulties faced with the previous methods, we propose
a novel clustering method using backscattering side-channel to enable the deployment of
reverse engineering techniques to a large population of ICs. The problem statement is as
follows: There are M fabricated ICs, denoted as IC1, IC2,...,ICM-1, ICM. Utilizing each IC, a
trace of features is extracted from its backscattering side-channel signals while it operates.
Each IC then can be represented as a point in a high dimensional space. These ICs can be
divided into clusters based on how hardware Trojan (if existed) affects their backscattering
side-channel signals. The objective of the proposed clustering algorithm is to divide all
tested IC into correct clusters, so that every IC in a cluster should belong to the same type
in terms of whether they are affected by HTs or not. This helps to reduce the size of test
vectors tremendously for reverse engineering techniques because only one IC is required
to test from each cluster.
5.4 A Novel Clustering Algorithm For Hardware Trojan Detection
5.4.1 The Impact of Hardware Trojan on Backscattering Side-Channel Signal
Nguyen et al. [73] have shown that HTs can be detected by analyzing impedance changes
within sub-clock samples, where the changes caused by HTs happen and can be observed
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on the clock signal. Figure 5.1 illustrates a theoretical example of a clock signal modeled
as a square wave with added Gaussian noise. Figure 5.1 shows a theoretical example of a
clock signal affected by HTs. As shown in the figures, if we can capture the backscattered
signal of sub-clock samples where the changes caused by HT can be observed, we can
detect the presence of HTs. However, the problem with the time-domain signal is that they
are often very noisy, therefore, difficult to extract and synchronize measurements to get
samples where changes caused by HTs happen.
In contrast, the changes caused by HTs occurring abruptly at some point in the clock
cycle can be observed in frequency domain by performing short Time Fourier transfor-
mation (STFT) on time-domain signal and observe which frequency components of time
domain signal are affected when dormant HT is present. Figure 5.3 shows Trojan-free and
Trojan-affected clock signals in the frequency domain by taking FFT of signals given in
Fig. 5.1 and Fig. 5.2, respectively. The signals in the frequency domain are much easier
to measure, and the noise power is very small because of focusing a single frequency bin
at a time. As a result, instead of measuring the time domain signal, we measure multiple
harmonics of the clock in the frequency domain to observe changes in sub-clock samples
for HT detection.
The change caused by HTs will be reflected in backscattered signals at the circuit’s
clock harmonics: fcarrier± fc, fcarrier± 2∗ fc, etc. The first clock harmonic at fcarrier± fc
follows the overall RCS change during a cycle, while the remaining harmonics are affected
by the rapidity of change (rise/fall times), and timing of the impedance changes within the
clock cycle. For each circuit, we measure the amplitude of the first N harmonics of the
clock from its backscattering side-channel signals to form a vector, which characterizes the
circuit’s overall amount, timing, and duration of impedance-change activity during a clock
cycle. If there is a hardware Trojan in the circuit, this vector will be different from the
ones recorded from an HT-free same circuit. As a result, we can represent each circuit by a
vector of N points, which are the amplitudes of the first N harmonics of the clock from its
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Figure 5.1: An example of a clock signal with noise.
backscattering side-channel signals: h = [h1, h2, ..., hN−1, hN ], where hj is the amplitude
of the jth harmonic of the clock. These vectors will be used as inputs for our clustering
algorithm.
If changes caused by HTs in the time-domain signal become briefer in duration, the
changes among clock harmonics become smaller in magnitude and shift to higher harmon-
ics which, compared to lower harmonics, tend to be affected more by noise. This is one of
the reasons why the backscattering side-channel works better for HT detection than other
traditional analog side-channels such as EM and Power side-channels. The backscatter-
ing side-channel is a consequence of the impedance changes in switching digital switching
circuits, which is caused by the transistors’ two-state impedances reflecting a modulated
signal. For each gate that switches, the impedance change persists for the rest of the cycle.
On the other hand, the EM and power side-channels are consequences of the variation of
the current flow in a circuit. As a gate switches, the current will be charged or discharged
quickly, which means a current burst occurs for a very short period of time.
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Changes caused by Trojan
Figure 5.2: An example of a clock signal affected by hardware Trojan.
5.4.2 Graph Model for Clustering Results
This section presents the proposed methodology to categorize ICs into clusters based on
how HTs (if present) affect their backscattering side-channel signals. Here we assume
yi =
[
yi1 yi2 · · · yi(N−1)
]
to be a vector containing the amplitude ratios of harmonics for
the ith board such that
yij = 10 ∗ log10(hi(j + 1)/hi(j)) (5.1)
where hi ∈ <N is a vector containing the harmonic amplitudes for the ith board. We use
the amplitude ratio instead of the amplitude itself to cancel out the attenuation caused by
the distance that affects all harmonics. We convert harmonic ratios from linear-domain
to dB-domain to prevent the magnitude dominance of the top ratios, and to increase the
effect of small harmonic ratios. Matrix Y is the matrix containing the harmonic ratios of
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Figure 5.3: Trojan-free and Trojan-affected clock signals in frequency domain generated
by fast Fourier transforming time domain signals in Fig. 5.1 and Fig. 5.2, respectively.









where M is the number of boards. The objective is to reveal the hidden information that
could be crucial to identifying Trojans in the data by removing the redundant information.
A popular technique to reduce the dimensionality of the problem is to keep the significant
information by applying Principle Components Analysis (PCA). These methods are espe-
cially practical for classification when the data exhibits linear characteristics. To utilize
these ideas, the first step is to obtain the singular value decomposition (SVD) of Y which
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can be written as
Y = UΣVT.
Figure 5.4: Ground truth information when half of the boards are randomly injected with a
Trojan.
Here we assume that the first m singular values are the largest m singular values of the
matrix Y, and Vm is a sub-matrix with the first m columns of V corresponding to these
m singular values. Therefore, to reduce the size of the data, we project Y onto the column
space of Vm as
YP = YVm. (5.3)
Here, the value of m is selected so that the power of the projected data is very close to the
power of Y, i.e.,
‖YP‖F/‖Y‖F ≈ 1 (5.4)
where ‖ • ‖F is the Frobenius norm of its argument. For example, in Fig. 5.4, we plot
the projected data when m = 3, where YP captures 99% of the power of Y, and when
half of the boards are infected with a Trojan. Here, sj denotes the singular value direction
corresponding to jth largest singular value.
After discarding the redundant information, the next step is to find the clusters in the
data. The expectation is that each cluster corresponds to different board groups due to pro-
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duction variability, or existence of a Trojan. To find the clusters and corresponding centroid
points, we utilize k-means algorithm. The algorithm requires the number of expected clus-
ters, NC , and their initial locations, LC ∈ <eNC×m (Each row represents the location of
the corresponding cluster), as input. A careful selection of the initial cluster locations is
important to avoid algorithm to converge to a local optimum. In that regard, we apply the
following procedure to initiate the k-means algorithm:
1.) Choose a random sample from the projected data as the location of the first cluster.
2.) Find a sample whose total distance is the furthest away from the previously chosen
clusters.
3.) Repeat until all centroids are initialized.
Figure 5.5: K-means clustering of the boards when the number of center points is chosen
to be six.
The procedure ensures wide separation of the centroids. We need to note here that,
NC is assumed to be larger than actual number of clusters in the data, i.e., larger than the
number of Trojan types. The assumption follows the fact that we have no information on
how many types of Trojan may exist in the testing devices in a realistic scenario. However,
having more than the number of actual clusters can be misleading because it can raise
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suspicion even when there is no Trojan-affected board in the sample space. For example,
in Fig. 5.5, we plot the results of the algorithm when NC = 6 for the data given in Fig.
5.4. Comparing the actual labels given in Fig. 5.4, we observe that there is no cluster that
contains both the original and Trojan-affected circuits. Therefore, we require a method that
decreases the number of clusters to reveal the existence of Trojan-affected circuits more
reliably.
To decrease the number of clusters, we propose to use graph method and the shortest
path algorithm. To accomplish that, we create a graph where each arc represents that two
centroids at the edges of an arc belong to the same group. Please note that “group” indicates
the Trojan type or whether the board is Trojan-affected. Our proposition is that the group of
two closest clusters are the same if the distance of these clusters are below some threshold.
In other words, the constraint on arcs is that an arc is valid only if the distance between
the cluster centroids at the edges is small than a given threshold. In that respect, the first
step is to obtain a threshold automatically. We can summarize the process of choosing the
threshold as follows:
1.) Calculate the distance among centroids.
2.) Choose the closest two clusters for each cluster, and keep the distances in a list.
3.) Assign threshold as the mean distance of this list.
To illustrate how algorithm works, the graph created by the algorithm is shown in Fig.
5.6 (a) for the clusters in Fig. 5.5. The nodes corresponding to the same classes are con-
nected. After generating the graph and identifying the valid arcs, the final step is to check
whether a node is reachable from another nodes. If there exists a path between any two
nodes, we label these as the same type, otherwise, we decide that the sample space contains
at least two clusters, therefore, some boards are Trojan-affected. To obtain the connected
nodes automatically, we exploit the shortest path algorithm [107] to check whether a node,
i.e., a cluster, is reachable from another node. The algorithm returns null if there is no
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path between two given nodes, and a path if these two nodes are reachable. Based on the
outcome of the shortest path, we relabel the sample space indicating whether the connected
nodes belong to same kind. An example of the process is given in Fig. 5.6 (b). We observe
that although the exact identity of these classes are not known, it is possible to divide data
into two groups, and therefore, to determine that the batch contains two circuit designs that
are not identical, or some of the boards are Trojan-affected.
(a) (b)
Figure 5.6: a) Generation of the graph based on the distances between the centroids of
the clusters, b) Clustering the data into two groups as Trojan injected vs. no-Trojan-free
boards. Labels inside the parenthesis indicate the ground truth.
5.5 Experimental Setup and Testing Scheme Formulation
5.5.1 Experiment Setup
The experimental setup to evaluate the performance of the proposed algorithm is shown in
Fig. 5.7. The setup includes a transmitter Aaronia E1 electric-field near-field probe [103]
connected to an Agilent MXG N5183A signal generator [108], and a receiver Aaronia H2
magnetic field near-field probe [103] connected to an Agilent MXA N9020A spectrum
analyzer [109]. The devices-under-test (DuT) are Altera DE0 Cyclone V FPGA boards
[110]. An angle ruler is used as a positioner so that different DE0-CV boards can be tested
using approximately the same position of probes. A laptop is used to control the devices
104
and automate the measurements. A 3 GHz continuous sinusoid signal is generated by the














Figure 5.7: Measurement setup for IC clustering using backscattering side-channel collec-
tion for HT detection.
5.5.2 Hardware Trojan Benchmark Implementation
To evaluate our technique, we implement three different benchmark circuits AES, RS232,
and PIC16F84 from the TrustHUB Trojan repository [102]. There are total of 21 Trojan
designs for AES circuit, 4 Trojan designs for PIC16F84 circuit, and 21 Trojan designs for
RS232 circuit. Because numerous HTs in the TrustHub repository are similar to each other,
we select circuits that exhibit different approaches for their triggers and payloads. Each of
these Trojans has a different triggering mechanism such as observing a specific sequence of
the input, counting number of encryption rounds, observing the number of execution of a
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(Percentage of HT-free circuit)
Trigger Payload Total
AES-T1200 0.32% 1.61% 1.93%
AES-T500 0.28% 1.51% 1.79%
AES-T700 0.27% 1.76% 2.03%
PIC16F84-T100 1.34% 1.81% 3.15%
PIC16F84-T300 1.37% 1.96% 3.33%
PIC16F84-T400 1.35% 1.75% 3.10%
RS232-T300 1.47% 1.58% 3.05%
RS232-T600 1.50% 1.48% 2.98%
RS232-T901 1.53% 1.61% 3.11%
specific instruction, etc., and performs a different payload functionality such as shortening
the hardware lifetime, leaking private keys, changing the address to program memory, etc.
Table 5.1 summarizes the benchmarks we use.
The Trojan-affected and Trojan-free designs are carefully mapped to the FPGA by using
ECO (Engineering Change Order) tools so that they have the same layout except for the
Trojan part, thus making for a fair comparison. As mentioned in Section 2.1 in Chapter 2, it
is extremely hard to activate an HT without a priori knowledge of its triggering circuit, it is
highly desirable for an HT detection technique to be able to detect HT when it is dormant.
As a result, our evaluation focuses on evaluating our algorithm for dormant HTs. In other
words, all Trojans stay inactive in all our experiments.
5.5.3 Testing Scheme Formulation
All HT benchmarks are implemented on Altera DE0 Cyclone V FPGA, and we test 100
boards by randomly infecting the boards. To prototype a real testing environment, for
each HT benchmark, we randomly program each of the 100 boards with HT-free or HT-
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infected designs and record its backscattering side-channel signals while the board is run-
ning. For each board, we extract the amplitude of the first 40 harmonics of the clock from
its backscattering side-channel signal. We only use 40 harmonics because the higher har-
monics are very weak and shrunk under the noise floor. As a result, for each hardware
Trojan benchmark, we will have a set of 100 traces, in which each trace contains 40 points,
denoted as follow: hi = [hi1, hi1, ..., hiN−1, hiN ] , where N = 40, and 1 ≤ i ≤ 100. Our
clustering algorithm takes these traces as inputs to cluster the ICs.
5.6 Evaluation
5.6.1 Evaluation of Existing Hardware Trojan Benchmarks
In this section, we provide the experimental results for Trojan detection. The process can
be summarized as follows:
→ Collect the data from all boards with the setup given in Fig. 5.7. The number of
boards tested for the experiments is 100.
→ Take the ratios of the consecutive harmonics, and convert them into dB-domain.
→ Collect the harmonic ratios for all boards in a matrix to generate Y.
→ Obtain SVD of Y, and project it into the space defined by the right-singular vectors
corresponding to largest m singular values to generate YP . Here, m is chosen such
that it is the smallest number of singular values satisfying the following equation:
‖YP‖F/‖Y‖F ≈ 0.999. (5.5)
→ Apply the k-means algorithm by ensuring NC is larger than the number of possible
Trojan types. The initialization of the centroids are done based on the procedure
given in Section 5.2.
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→ Generate the graph of similarity with respect to the threshold calculated in Section
5.2.
→ Apply shortest path algorithm to reveal possible classes in the sample space. If the
algorithm returns more than one cluster, the batch of boards contains some Trojan-
affected boards.
Since the goal of the paper is to separate the Trojan-free designs from all other Trojan-
affected designs, we define the accuracy of the measurements as
accuracy (%) =
# of correct labeling
whether the design is original
# of measurements
× 100. (5.6)
1a) PIC16F84-T100 1b) PIC16F84-T300 1c) PIC16F84-T400 1d) PIC16F84
2b) AES-T1200 2a) AES-T500 2c) AES-T700 2d) AES
3a) RS232-T300 3b) RS232-T600 3c) RS232-T901 3d) RS232
Figure 5.8: Separation of the Trojan-free and the Trojan-affected circuits. First three
columns contain the plots when only one Trojan exists, and the last column of figures
are when all considered Trojans exist in the sample space.
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Please note that the actual labels of the circuits are only required to calculate the accuracy of
the proposed method. Therefore, after having the outcome of the procedure given above, we
first identify the group which contains the most of the original designs, and then label this
group as the Trojan-free and the rest as the Trojan-affected circuits. Finally, we compare
our labels with the actual labels to calculate the accuracy. If the proposed method classifies
all the original designs in a cluster, and if this cluster does not contain any samples from
Trojan-affected designs, the accuracy of the algorithm will be equivalent to 100%.
The tested designs are given in Table 5.1. We first work on PIC16F84 circuit with 3
different Trojan designs. The results are plotted by considering the singular vectors corre-
sponding largest three singular values. The outcome of the procedure is given in Fig. 5.8
(1a-1d). The figures in Fig. 5.8 (1a-1c) correspond to the scenarios when the batch contains
only one Trojan type. However, Fig. 5.8 (1d) includes samples from all Trojan designs.
The number of singular values used for these experiments that satisfies the condition given
in (5.5) is 10, and NC = 6. We also plot the sample distances to each cluster centroid in
Fig. 5.9 (a) and their distribution in Fig. 5.9 (b) for the samples given in Fig. 5.8 (1a). The
mean distances of Cluster - 1 samples to the centroids are 4.96 and 22.27 with standard
deviations 3.47 and 5.03, whereas mean distances of Cluster - 2 samples are 23.39 and
6.08 with standard deviations 5.46 and 2.95, respectively. We achieve 100% accuracy for
all of the experiments. We need to note here that the legends of the figures do not give
any information whether the group is Trojan-affected or original. They only provide the
information that the sample space contains two different groups, hence, one of these groups
represents the designs with Trojan. However, we provide the actual labels of the classes in
parentheses for a better illustration.
The other experiments are done with AES and RS232 circuits. Similarly, the results are
shown in Fig. 5.8 (2a-2d) and Fig. 5.8 (3a-3d) for AES and RS232, respectively. The plots
in Fig. 5.8 (2a-2c) and in Fig. 5.8 (3a-3c) correspond the experiments when the board batch
contains only one Trojan design type for AES and RS232, respectively. The experiments
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(a) (b)
Figure 5.9: a) Distances of each circuit to the cluster centroids. b) Distribution of distances
of each circuit to each cluster centroid.
with all considered Trojan designs are shown in Fig. 5.8 (2d) and in Fig. 5.8 (3d). We keep
the number of clusters, NC , same for PIC16F84 circuit. This time, the number of singular-
values satisfying the equation given in (5.5) corresponds to 12 for each circuit. Similarly,
we obtain 100% accuracy for all these experiments meaning that all the original circuits
are separated from the designs that is Trojan-affected, and clustered in a single group.
From the results, we can make the following observations:
I) The backscattering side-channel is a powerful mechanism to detect the existence of
a Trojan when the ratios of the harmonics are exploited since the separation between
the Trojan-free and Trojan-affected circuits are significant.
II) The proposed methodology (backscattered signal plus PCA and k-means algorithm)
enables perfect clustering of the Trojan-free and Trojan-affected circuits.
III) When multi-Trojan designs are considered, they still behave like a single group, and
the proposed method can successfully distinguish the existence of at least two differ-
ent classes.
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Table 5.2: Hardware Trojan Benchmarks and Detection Results for Different Size of Tro-
jan’s Trigger
Benchmark Size of Trojan’s Trigger
(Percentage of HT-free circuit)
RS232-T300 w/ 1/2 Trigger Size 0.76%
RS232-T300 w/ 1/4 Trigger Size 0.39%
RS232-T300 w/ 1/8 Trigger Size 0.19%
5.6.2 Evaluation of Changing Size of Hardware Trojan Triggers
Because the algorithm performs so well on the existing HT designs in Table 5.1, this section
focuses on testing the limit of our algorithm by reducing the size of HTs. The authors
in [73] demonstrated that only the trigger is active while the payload stays inert when
hardware Trojans are dormant, thus if the trigger is big enough, the Trojans can be detected
regardless of its payload size. Therefore, we will focus on changing the size of the trigger
to test the limits of the proposed algorithm. The RS232-T300 is chosen for this experiment
because the trigger of the Trojan can be meaningfully resized. We change the size of the
trigger of RS232-T300 while keeping its payload the same to create test designs that are
summarized in Table 5.2.
The first goal is to investigate whether the proposed method still works when only one
HT benchmark exists in the board batch. The same parameters with the experiments given
in Section 5.6.1 are used for the number of clusters and singular vectors. The clustering
results are given in Fig. 5.10. We again obtain 100% accuracy in terms of separating
the original circuits from the Trojan-affected ones. Here, one important observation is
that as the size of the Trojan trigger decreases, the distance between centroids of the two
classes decreases, i.e. the Trojan does become more similar to the original circuit when
it only has 1/8 trigger size than when it has a full-size trigger. To illustrate this, we show
clustering results where the measurements from all trigger sizes were included, i.e. five










Figure 5.10: Separation of the Trojan-free and the Trojan-affected circuits when the size of
RS232-T300 varies.
trigger sizes), are subjected to our clustering technique. The results are shown in Fig.
5.11, with actual (ground-truth) labels (left) and with clustering-produced labels (right). In
terms of separating HT-free from HT-infected designs, the accuracy of this clustering is
still 100% (all HT-free instances are in one cluster while all HT-infected instances are in
other clusters). Furthermore, the technique is able to distinguish (put in separate clusters)
different variants of the HT, except for the variants with 1/4 and 1/8 triggers, which are in
the same cluster. We note that the technique is able to distinguish the 1/8-trigger variant
from an HT-free design, even though it did not distinguish 1/4- from the 1/8-trigger variant
(the difference among them is also 1/8 of the full trigger). This is because the additional
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trigger activity in the 1/4 variant is similar to the trigger activity in the 1/4 variant, i.e. it is
only a matter of how much trigger activity the design has. In contrast, the HT-free design
has no trigger activity at all, so the presence of trigger activity in the 1/8 design allows it
to be well-separated from the HT-free design. This implies that HTs whose circuitry and
activity mimics that of the original design would be more difficult to detect, but only up to
a point – even such activity-mimicking HTs would be detected is they are sufficiently large
(in this particular experiment, larger than 0.19% of the original circuit).
1) RS232-T300 Ground Truth 2) RS232-T300 Estimates
Figure 5.11: Separation of original and Trojan-affected circuits when the size of RS232-
T300 varies. The experiments are performed with original, full-Trigger-size, 1/2-Trigger-
size, 1/4-Trigger-size, and 1/8-Trigger-size circuits.
Based on the results given in this section and Section 5.6.1, our main observation is
that our technique successfully separates HT-free from HT-infected designs, even for very
small HTs (0.19% of the original circuit, in our experiments). Additionally, the technique
successfully separates different HT designs from each other, except when the HTs only
differ in size (but not nature) of their trigger circuitry, and that difference in size is very
small (0.19% of the original circuit, in our experiments).
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5.7 Conclusions
This chapter proposes a novel golden-chip-free method for clustering fabricated integrated
circuits into groups for deployment of reverse engineering based hardware Trojan detec-
tion techniques to a large population of ICs. Our technique classifies boards into clusters
based on how hardware Trojans (if existed) affect their backscattering side-channel signals.
Unlike prior clustering approaches, the paper uses the backscattering side-channel, which
has been shown to work better for hardware Trojan detection than other side-channels. We
test the proposed algorithm on a set of 100 boards to thoroughly evaluate manufacturing
variations among different hardware instances. This approach requires no priori knowledge
about the chip or Trojan circuitry to cluster ICs into groups for HT detection. The results
show that our technique can tolerate manufacturing variations among hardware instances
to cluster all boards correctly for not only 9 different dormant Trojan designs on 3 different
benchmark circuits from Trusthub, but also dormant Trojan designs whose trigger size is
shrunk to as small as 0.19% of the original circuit.
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CHAPTER 6
COUNTERFEIT IC DETECTION USING BACKSCATTERING SIDE-CHANNEL
6.1 Overview
Over the past few years, globalization of the semiconductor supply chain has led companies
to outsource much of the production cycle for integrated circuits. While outsourcing helps
companies significantly reduce their cost and time-to-market, it also introduces concerns
about the trustworthiness of an ICs. One of the most serious problems is counterfeiting of
ICs, which not only negatively impacts innovation and economic growth of the IC industry,
but also creates serious threats and risks for systems that incorporate those counterfeit ICs.
This chapter proposes a novel method that uses the backscattering side-channel to clus-
ter ICs such that counterfeits are separated from legitimate ICs. The backscattering side-
channel, which has been introduced only recently, has been proven to outperform other
side-channels in detecting hardware Trojan horses (HTs), i.e., ICs where additional logic
gates (and connections to existing logic gates) have been added. In this work, we use it
to robustly separate ICs into legitimate and counterfeit ones, even when only layout or
placement of the IC has changed, without any added logic or connections. We evaluate our
technique on a set of ten boards over six different counterfeit IC designs, and find that our
technique tolerates manufacturing variations among different hardware instances, detecting
counterfeit ICs with 100% accuracy and 0% false positives.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 6.2 explains our new technique
for counterfeit IC detection, Section 6.3 describes the setup for out experimental evaluation,
Section 6.4 presents the results of that evaluation and, finally, Section 6.5 concludes the
chapter.
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6.2 A Novel Approach for Counterfeit Detection
6.2.1 Using Backscattering Side-Channel for Counterfeit IC Detection
Nguyen et al. [64] have shown that HTs can be detected by analyzing how impedance
changes during a clock cycle, and comparing the impedance changes of the IC under test
to those of a “golden” IC (i.e., an IC that is known to be free of HTs). As pointed out by
Nguyen et al. [64], however, time-domain reception/recording of the backscattered signal
for this would require extremely high bandwidth (many times the clock frequency of the
IC), and the signal distortion due to radio-frequency (RF) noise, quantization noise (ADC
resolution), imperfect synchronization (jitter), etc., would make it difficult to identify small
changes caused by the presence of a stealthy HT. Thus, the backscattered signal was instead
measured in the frequency domain, at multiple harmonics of the ICs clock frequency, which
directly correspond (through Discrete Fourier Transform) to time-domain samples during
the clock cycle. These frequency-domain measurements can be very accurate because they
can be collected as separate frequency-bin measurements (with slower but more accurate
ADCs), averaged over many clock cycles to reduce the impact of RF noise and jitter.
In these measurements, the change caused by an HT will be reflected in backscattered
signals at the harmonics of the circuit’s clock frequency: fcarrier ± fc, fcarrier ± 2 ∗ fc, etc.
The first clock harmonic at fcarrier ± fc follows the overall RCS change during a cycle,
while the remaining harmonics are affected by the rapidity of change (rise/fall times), and
timing of the impedance changes within the clock cycle.
In the time domain, when state changes caused by HTs become briefer in duration, the
corresponding frequency-domain changes at the clock harmonics become smaller in mag-
nitude and shift to higher harmonics. Compared to lower harmonics, the higher harmonics
tend to be affected more by noise, clock jitter, and other measurement impairments. One
of the key reasons why the backscattering side-channel is highly suitable for HT detection
(compared to traditional analog side-channels such as EM and power) is that impedance
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changes, once they happen, persist for the rest of the cycle, so larger changes in impedance
tend to affect relatively low harmonics of the clock in the backscattered signal. In contrast,
the current bursts that create EM and power signals are already very brief, and the presence
of an HT tends to change the magnitude of these bursts and/or shift their timing within the
cycle, so the presence of the HT tends to only affect higher harmonics of the clock.
In this work, we follow the measurement approach of Nguyen et al. [64]. Specifically,
for each circuit, we measure the amplitude of the first N harmonics of the clock from
its backscattering side-channel signals to form a vector, which characterizes the circuit’s
overall amount, timing, and duration of impedance-change activity during a clock cycle.
Thus, we can represent each circuit by a vector of N points, which are the amplitudes
of the first N harmonics of the clock from its backscattering side-channel signals: h =
[h1, h2, ..., hN−1, hN ], where hj is the amplitude of the jth harmonic of the clock. These
vectors will be used as inputs for our clustering algorithm that identifies counterfeit ICs,
even when they only differ from legitimate ICs in layout or placement on the chip, without
any additional gates (or connections among gates) compared to the original IC. This is in
contrast to Nguyen et al. [64], which focused on detection of HTs, i.e., on detection of IC
where additional logic gates (and connections to existing gates) are present.
6.2.2 One-Class-Classification to Detect Counterfeit ICs
In this section, we introduce our one-class-classification technique that accurately detects
whether or not the IC’s layout is the legitimate one. The approach is based on super-
vised learning techniques which contain two phases: training and testing. In the training
phase, the goal is to obtain parameters of the cluster that correcponds to back-scattered sig-
nals at clock-frequency harmonics for a legitimate IC. The testing phase then determines
whether measured back-scattered signals for an IC-under-test map within or outside of the
legitimate-IC cluster.
To achieve our goal, we first collect magnitudes of the first N harmonics as described
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Figure 6.1: Harmonic magnitudes of the original circuit in the training phase.
in Section 6.2.1. An example of the original ICs harmonic magnitudes are given in Figure
6.1. We observe that the harmonics are generally dense around the mean for each harmonic
yet magnitudes vary significantly among different harmonics. Therefore, our model first
considers each harmonic independently, and then combines the results of harmonics to








where M is the number of training measurements, and hm is a row vector containing the
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(6.2)
and hm[k] = hkm. To proceed further, let assume MD be the distance of the most deviated









where max{•} returns a row vector which contains the maximum values at each column
of its argument, abs{•} returns the magnitude of its argument, 1 ∈ <M is a column vector
with full of ones, and H is a matrix such that each row represents a measurement, and each
column contains the corresponding harmonic value.
Figure 6.2: Average harmonic magnitudes and confidence intervals of the original circuit
for each harmonic.
Density estimation, a common method in one-class-classification, works better with
large numbers of measurements [115]. However, having such a large sample space is diffi-
cult and takes really long time to collect signals. Therefore, by mimicking the well-known
“3σ” rule, we define the confidence interval for the mth harmonic as
[ĥ[m]− 3 ·MD[m], ĥ[m] + 3 ·MD[m]]. (6.4)
An example of the intervals and the average harmonic signal is given in Figure 6.2.
One of the main observations is that the spread around each harmonic varies, therefore,
considering each harmonic independently gives better insight about the layout. For an even
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Figure 6.3: Normalized harmonic magnitudes and decision boundaries of the original cir-
cuit for each harmonic.
better illustration of the harmonics, we normalize the data as follows:
H = (H− 1ĥ) ./ (1MD) (6.5)
where “./” is the pairwise division operation. After this normalization of the data, the
confidence interval or decision boundaries are fixed to between -1 and 1. After the normal-
ization, the training data and the boundaries are given in Figure 6.3. Finally, when testing
an IC, the layout is called
• Original if all measured harmonics are within the corresponding confidence intervals,
• Counterfeit if there is at least one harmonic values which violates its confidence
interval.
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6.3 Benchmark Implementation and Experiment Setup
Counterfeit IC Benchmark Implementation
For our experimental evaluation, we implement two different types of counterfeit IC: 1)
Counterfeit ICs with the same functionality as the original but different physical imple-
mentation (position) of the circuit, and 2) Counterfeit ICs with the same functionality and
position as the original but different physical layout (routing and placement) of the circuit.
• Counterfeit ICs with Different Layout: We have implemented several counterfeit IC
examples by re-compiling and letting the EDA tool to change the placement and
routing of the circuit. We have four different test subject designs: Original layout
AES IC, 1st layout AES counterfeit IC, 2nd layout AES counterfeit IC, 3rd layout
AES counterfeit IC.
• Counterfeit ICs with Changed Position: We have implemented several counterfeit IC
examples by moving the placement of the AES circuit from its original placement.
We have four different test subject designs: original position AES IC, 1st position
AES counterfeit IC, 2nd position AES counterfeit IC, and 3rd position AES counter-
feit IC.
Experimental Setup
The experimental setup to evaluate the performance of the proposed algorithm is shown in
Fig. 6.4. The setup includes a transmitter Aaronia E1 electric-field near-field probe [103]
connected to an Agilent MXG N5183A signal generator [108], and a receiver Aaronia H2
magnetic field near-field probe [103] connected to an Agilent MXA N9020A spectrum
analyzer [109]. The devices-under-test (DuT) are Altera DE0 Cyclone V FPGA boards
[110]. An angle ruler is used as a positioner so that different DE0-CV boards can be tested
using approximately the same position of probes. A laptop is used to control the devices
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and automate the measurements. A 3 GHz continuous sinusoidal signal is generated by the














Figure 6.4: Measurement setup for counterfeit IC detection using backscattering side-
channel.
6.4 Experimental Results and Discussion
In this section, we provide experimental results when layout or placement position of the
circuit changes. We will first perform an experiment when the layout of the circuit changes
while keeping functionality the same. The results are given in Figure 6.5-6.8. Recall that
the harmonic values and the boundaries are normalized based on the equation given in (6.5).
During testing, in this equation H is a matrix, where each row is a test measurement, ĥ is
the mean harmonic values obtained from training measurements, and MD is the maximum
deviation row vector for each harmonic which is also obtained in the training phase. Figure
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6.5 shows the harmonics for the original layout, along with confidence intervals obtained
from training. We observe that all considered harmonics are well within the confidence
interval, and thus all these measurements are labeled as corresponding to the original IC
(0% false positive rate).
Next, we experiment with counterfeit layouts, which have the same functionality as the
original IC but different layout. Figures 6.6, 6.7 and 6.8 illustrate the harmonic values for
different counterfeits of this kind. We observe that all of the measurements have at least one
component that violates the confidence intervals (100% true positives, i.e. 100% accuracy
in detecting counterfeits of this kind).
Figure 6.5: Normalized harmonic magnitudes of the original circuit.
Another experiment is performed by changing the placement location of the circuit
within the chip, while keeping its functionality and layout same. The results are given
in Figure 6.9-6.12. Figure 6.9 shows the results of our testing for instances of the original
circuit which, like in Figure 6.6, correctly labels all these instances as original. Figure 6.10-
6.12 show the results of position-change counterfeits. For each of these counterfeits, at
least one harmonic is outside the confidence interval, causing all these counterfeits to be
accurately labeled as counterfeit. Overall, for this type of counterfeit IC our method again
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Figure 6.6: Normalized harmonic magnitudes of the circuit with the same functionality and
a different layout.
achieves 100% detection accuracy.
In summary, both experiments reveal that our methodology is a very powerful and ro-
bust to identify the counterfeit circuits.
6.5 Conclusions
Over the past few years, globalization of the semiconductor supply chain has led companies
to outsource much of the production cycle for integrated circuits (ICs). While outsourcing
helps companies significantly reduce their cost and time-to-market, it also introduces con-
cerns about the trustworthiness of an IC. One of the most serious problems is counterfeit-
ing of ICs, which not only negatively impacts innovation and economic growth of the IC
industry, but also creates serious threats and risks for systems that incorporate those coun-
terfeit ICs. This chapter proposes a novel method that uses the backscattering side-channel
to cluster ICs such that counterfeits are separated from legitimate ICs. The backscatter-
ing side-channel, which has been introduced only recently, has been proven to outperform
other side-channels in detecting hardware Trojan horses (HTs), i.e., ICs where additional
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Figure 6.7: Normalized harmonic magnitudes of the circuit with the same functionality and
a different layout.
logic gates (and connections to existing logic gates) have been added. In this work we use
it to robustly separate ICs into legitimate and counterfeit ones, even when only layout or
placement of the IC has changed, without any added logic or connections. We evalute our
technique on a set of ten boards over six different counterfeit IC designs, and find that our
technique tolerates manufacturing variations among different hardware instances, detecting
counterfeit ICs with 100% accuracy and 0% false positives.
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Figure 6.8: Normalized harmonic magnitudes of the circuit with the same functionality and
a different layout.
Figure 6.9: Normalized harmonic magnitudes of the original circuit.
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Figure 6.10: Normalized harmonic magnitudes of the counterfeit circuit with the same
functionality and and layout, but different placement position 1.
Figure 6.11: Normalized harmonic magnitudes of the counterfeit circuit with the same
functionality and and layout, but different placement position 2.
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Figure 6.12: Normalized harmonic magnitudes of the counterfeit circuit with the same
functionality and and layout, but different placement position 3.
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CHAPTER 7
GOLDEN-CHIP-FREE HARDWARE TROJAN DETECTION TECHNIQUE
USING BACKSCATTERING SIDE-CHANNEL
7.1 Overview
Among hardware Trojan detection techniques, side-channel analysis approaches are the
most widely used ones because they are non-destructive, relatively cheap, and fast, which
is suitable for testing a large number of ICs. Especially, externally-measured side-channel
analysis approaches are dominantly preferred because they require no modifications to the
chip circuitry. Externally-measured side-channel analysis methods rely on measuring some
non-functional properties from outside the IC as it operates, and comparing the measure-
ments to reference signals produced by either simulation or a verified genuine device. Be-
cause it is exceedingly difficult to model the EM and power signal of digital circuit, most
of the existing side-channel analysis based HT detection techniques rely on the assump-
tion of having a golden (HT-free) chip for training. This assumption is too strong, and
often unrealistic, which prevents them from being used for practical deployments of HT
detection.
Motivated by the shortcomings of previous techniques, this chapter proposes a novel
golden-chip-free hardware Trojan detection technique using backscattering side-channel
with circuit impedance modeling. We use the backscattering side-channel because the
backscattering side-channel outperforms other side-channels in hardware Trojan detection,
as demonstrated in the previous chapters. In addition, the backscattering side-channel is
impedance-based, while other traditional side-channels such as EM and power are current-
flow based. It is relatively easier to model and predict the impedance changes than the
current-flow changes of a circuit. Furthermore, when a HT is attached to the circuit, it
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changes the circuit impedance, regardless of whether it is activated or not. That is why we
decided to use the backscattering side-channel for our golden-chip-free hardware Trojan
detection technique.
Unlike previous techniques, we build models that help calculate the reference impedances
of benchmark circuits. It is much less complicated and more accurate to estimate the
impedance of a circuit than estimating the current-flow changes in a complex IC. Using the
models, we estimate the impedances of benchmark circuits, and then estimate the expected
powers of the backscattering side-channel signal of clock harmonics. Then we compare the
measurements against the models to detect HTs without having to have a golden sample.
We start with simple circuits such as transistor and inverter, then build up to impedance
models for more complex circuits. These models are used to calculate the reference impedances
of the circuits, and then the expected values of the backscattered signal power of the clock
harmonics. The models are compared against the measurements. Our algorithms report a
design as Trojan-free if the measurements match the model, and report a design as Trojan-
infected otherwise.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 7.2 discusses the first order
analysis of digital circuits and theoretical assumptions for our impedance model. Section
7.3 presents our impedance model, while Section 7.4 introduces the golden-chip-free HT
detection techniques. Sections 7.5 and 7.6 evaluate the effectiveness of the technique on
different Trojan benchmarks. Finally, Section 7.7 concludes this chapter.
7.2 First Order Analysis of Digital Circuits
Integrated circuits consist of millions or even billions transistors, and even a single deep-
submicron transistor itself is considered as a complex device. Its behavior is heavily non-
linear and is influenced by a large number of second-order effects [116]. Therefore, the
question that needs to be answered is how to abstract the behavior of MOS transistors,
and thus digital circuits, into a simple and tangible analytical model that does not lead to
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exceedingly complicated equations, yet captures the essentials of the circuit. It turns out
that the first-order expressions can be combined into a single expression that meets these
goals [117].
Analyzing the behavior of integrated circuits consisting of billions transistors is difficult
and cumbersome. Therefore, the following substantial simplifications are made in order to
enable modeling of integrated circuits without intolerable accuracy degrades:
• A transistor can be considered as a switch controlled by its gate signal. An NMOS
transistor is on when the gate signal is high and is off when the gate signal is low.
Inversely, a PMOS transistor is on when the gate signal is low and off when the gate
signal is high as illustrated in Fig 7.1 [117].
• The equivalent effective resistance is the ratio of Vds to Ids averaged across the
switching interval of interest. Therefore, the transistor is nothing more than a switch
with an infinite equivalent effective off-resistance (for | Vgs | < | VT |), and a finite
equivalent effective on-resistance (for | Vgs | > | VT |) [117].
• The logic levels do not depend on the relative device sizes, so that the transistors can
be minimum size. As a result, all transistors in the circuit have the same size, hence
the same equivalent effective resistance [116].
• Long-channel model is used and all short-channel effects can be ignored. As a result,
the resistance of two transistors in series is the sum of the resistances of each transis-
tor, and the total resistance of a set of resistors in parallel is found by adding up the
reciprocals of the resistance values, and then taking the reciprocal of the total [116].
• No direct path exists between the supply and ground rails under steady-state operat-
ing conditions (this is, when the input and outputs remain constant). The absence of
current flow (ignoring leakage currents) means that the gate does not consume any
static power [117].
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• Interconnect assumptions [117]:
– Inductive effects can be ignored if the resistance of the wire is substantial. This
is for instance the case for long Aluminum wires with a small cross-section, or
if the rise and fall times of the applied signals are slow.
– When the wires are short, the cross-section of the wire is large, or the inter-
connect material used has a low resistivity, a capacitance-only model can be
used.
– when the separation between neighboring wires is large, or when the wires only
run together for a short distance, inter-wire capacitance can be ignored, and all
the parasitic capacitance can be modeled as capacitance to ground.
– No long interconnect is present in the circuit.
Figure 7.1: Switch Model of CMOS Transistor [117].
Based on these assumptions, it is possible to do first order analysis to build models for es-
timating the impedance, which includes equivalent resistance and capacitance, of a circuit.
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7.2.1 Equivalent Effective Resistance
As mentioned above, our model is based on the assumption that the transistor is nothing
more than a switch with an infinite equivalent effective off-resistance, and a finite equiv-
alent effective on-resistance Req−on. Because the on-resistance of the transistor is still
time-variant, non-linear and depending upon the operation point of the transistor, we de-
fine Req−on as an average value of the resistance over the operation region of interest. If the
resistance does not experience any strong non-linearities over the range of the averaging
interval, the equivalent effective resistance Req−on can be calculated by the average value














Where VDS is the voltage between the drain and the source of transistor, ID is the cur-
rent flowing through the channel when the transistor is on. We are interested in the point
where the voltage on the capacitor reaches the mid-point (VDD/2), where VDD is the supply
voltage. We assume that the the saturation voltage VDSAT of the transistor and the transis-




























where IDSAT is the saturated current, k′ is the the process transconductance parameter, W
is the width of the transistor, L is the channel length of the transistor, Cox stands for the
capacitance per unit area presented by the gate oxide, εox = 3.97εo = 3.5 ∗ 1011F/m is
the oxide permittivity, tox is the thickness of the oxide, µ is the mobility of the channel of
an transistor, VT is the threshold voltage of the transistor, and λ is an empirical parameter,
called the channel-length modulation. The product of the process transconductance and the
(W/L) ratio of an transistor is called the gain factor of the device. λ varies roughly with the
inverse of the channel length. In other words, the drain-junction depletion region presents
a larger fraction of the channel in shorter transistors, thus the channel-modulation effect is
more pronounced. λ can be considered as zero because we assume that all short-channel
effects can be dismissed. From the formula, we can see that the resistance is inversely
proportional to the (W/L) ratio of the device. For a specific technology (45 nm, 22 nm,
etc.), the channel length L is fixed, only the width of the transistor can be changed. As a
result, doubling the transistor width halves the resistance.
Table 7.1 summarizes the parameters needed for estimating the resistance of a transistor
in 22 nm technology. As discussed, all the parameters except the transistor width are fixed
for a specific technology. Table 7.2 shows resistance of a transistor in 22 nm technology
with different values of transistor width. In the table, RN is the equivalent on-resistance of
an NMOS transistor, and RP is the equivalent on-resistance of an PMOS transistor. As we
can see, with the same transistor width, the on-resistance of PMOS is bigger than NMOS
because PMOS has lower mobility compared to NMOS. As a result, normally PMOS is
sized to a bigger size so the values of RN and RP are similar, thus making the rise-time
deday and fall-time delay similar.
7.2.2 Equivalent Capacitance
It is nearly impossible to manually analyze MOS circuits where each capacitor is consid-
ered individually. Therefore, we assume that all capacitances can be lumped together into
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Table 7.2: Estimated resistances for different values of W/L
Resistances
Values
(W/L) = 2 (W/L) = 5 (W/L) = 10 (W/L) = 20
RP 17.41 kΩ 6.964 kΩ 3.482 kΩ 1.741 kΩ
RN 7.213 kΩ 2.885 kΩ 1.442 kΩ 0.721 kΩ
one single capacitor CL, located between Vout and GND.
Figure 7.2 shows all the capacitances of transistors in a NOT gate, in which Cgd12 is
the gate-drain capacitance, Cdb1 and Cdb2 are the diffusion capacitances between drain and
bulk, Cw is the capacitance due to the wiring, and Cg3, Cg4 are the gate capacitances of
fanout. Our model assumes that all capacitances are lumped together into one single ca-
pacitor CL, located between Vout and GND as illustrated in Fig. 7.3. This load capacitance
CL is the combination of Cgd12, Cdb1, Cdb2, Cw, Cg3, and Cg4.
Gate-Drain Capacitance
Under the assumption that transistors are either in cut-off or in the saturation mode during
switching transition, the only contributions to Cgd12 are the overlap capacitances because
the channel capacitance of the MOS transistors does not play a role here, as it is located
either completely between gate and bulk (cut-off) or gate and source (saturation) [117].
Therefore, the gate-drain capacitance can be calculated as illustrated in equation 7.5, where
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Figure 7.2: Parasitic capacitances of transistors in a NOT gate [117].
Figure 7.3: Equivalent lumped capacitance.
CGDOn and CGDOp are the gate-drain overlap capacitance per unit area.
Cgdn = CGDOnWn, Cgdp = CGDOpWp (7.5)
Considering the Miller effect, this floating gate-drain capacitor can be replaced by a
capacitance-to-ground capacitor whose capacitance is twice the actual gate-drain capaci-
tance. This is because during a low-high or high-low transition, the terminals of the gate-
drain capacitor are moving in opposite directions as illustrated in Fig. 7.4. As a result, the
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equivalent capacitance to ground can be calculated as shown in the equation 7.6.
CMgdn = 2 ∗ CGDOnWn, CMgdp = 2 ∗ CGDOpWp (7.6)
Figure 7.4: The Miller effect: Equivalent capacitance-to-ground capacitor of the gate-drain
capacitor [117].
Diffusion Capacitances
Due to the reverse-biased pn-junction between the drain and the body (bulk) of the transis-
tor, there is a diffusion capacitance between the drain and the body. This capacitance can
be replaced by a linear one with the same change in charge for the voltage range of interest
[117]. Assuming that Cj0, Cjsw0 are the bottom junction capacitance per unit area and side-
wall junction capacitance per unit area under zero-bias conditions, AD is the drain area, and
PD is the perimeter of the drain area. Equation 7.7 shows the relationship between the lin-
earized capacitor and the value of the junction capacitance under zero-bias conditions,i.e.,
Ceq = KeqAD ∗ Cj0 +KeqswPD ∗ Cjsw0, (7.7)
where Keq and Keqsw are multiplication factors which depend on the junction potential and
the grading coefficient of the junction.
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Wiring Capacitance
The capacitance due to wiring depends upon the length and width of the connecting wires,
and is a function of the distance of the fanout from the driving gate and the number of
fanout gates and is normally obtained by extraction from the design. Without knowing the
routing, placement and the design itself, it is impossible to estimate the value of wiring
capacitance. However, we can simplify the problem by assuming that there is no long
interconnect in the design. As a result the wiring capacitance is small compared to other
capacitances. The wiring capacitance can be assumed to be half the value of the gate-drain
capacitance of an NMOS transistor [117, 118].
Fanout Capacitances
By assuming that all components of the gate capacitance are connected between V out and
GND and the channel capacitance of the connecting gate is constant over the interval of
interest, the fanout capacitance equals the total gate capacitance of the loading gates as












where CGi is the gate capacitance of the loading transistor i that is driven by the transis-
tor whose fanout capacitance needs calculated. CGi includes gate-source overlap capaci-
tanceCGSOi, gate-drain overlap capacitanceCGDOi, and gate-channel capacitanceWiLCox.
CGSOi and CGDOi are the gate-source and gate-drain overlap capacitance, respectively.
Table 7.3 summarizes the capacitances that contribute to the total CL and their formula.
Note that when a gate switches from high to low, CL has a different value when the inverter
switches from low to high. The total impedance of a circuit is the combination of resistance
and capacitance is calculated as Z = R + 1/(jωC) = R + 1/(j2πfC), where f is the
frequency. Table 7.2 shows two different impedance state of the circuit in 22 nm technology
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Table 7.3: Capacitances that contributes to the total CL
Capacitor Expression
CMgd1 2 ∗ CGDOnWn









Table 7.4: Estimated impedances for different values of W/L
Impedance
Value
(W/L) = 2 (W/L) = 5 (W/L) = 10 (W/L) = 20
R1 17.41 kΩ 6.964 kΩ 3.482 kΩ 1.741 kΩ
R0 7.213 kΩ 2.885 kΩ 1.442 kΩ 0.721 kΩ
CL1 0.182 fF 0.383 fF 0.647 fF 1.175 fF
CL0 0.184 fF 0.386 fF 0.652 fF 1.184 fF
1/(jωCL1) -j290.724 kΩ -j138.44 kΩ -j81.974 kΩ -j45.146 kΩ
1/(jωCL0) -j288.498 kΩ -j137.38 kΩ -j81.336 kΩ -j44.791 kΩ
Z1 = R1 +
1
jωCL1
17.41-j290.724 kΩ 6.964-j138.44 kΩ 3.482-j81.974 kΩ 1.741-j45.146 kΩ
Z0 = R0 +
1
jωCL0
7.213-j288.498 kΩ 2.885-j137.38 kΩ 1.442-j81.336 kΩ 0.721-j44.791 kΩ
with different values of transistor width and frequency of 3.051 Ghz.
7.3 Impedance Model
Digital circuits are built by transistors, therefore, we use a transistor as the unit to build the
impedance model of digital circuits. Cheng et al. [119] introduce a modulation loss factor,
M, which relates the backscattered signal power to transistors’ impedance variation of the




∣∣∣∣Z1(x)− 377Z1(x) + 377 − Z0(x)− 377Z0(x) + 377
∣∣∣∣2 , (7.9)
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where Z1(x) and Z0(x) are the estimated impedances of switching states of the circuit im-
plemented on FPGA. An FPGA chip consists of logic blocks, which are arranged in a two
dimensional grid and are connected by a programmable routing interconnect. This symmet-
rical grid is connected to I/O blocks which make off-chip connections. The “programmable/re-
configurable” term in FPGAs indicates their ability to implement a new function on the chip
after its fabrication is complete. From the power source point of view, all these blocks are in
parallel. Therefore, let parameter x represent the percentage of total logic resources being









where Z1 and Z0 are the estimated impedance of switching state of a circuit whose size is
one percentage of total resources are utilized. On the other hand, the impedances Z1 and
Z0 can be expressed as
Z1 = R1 +
1
jωC1




where R1 and R0 are switching resistances, C1 and C0 are switching capacitances, respec-
tively. Zpkg is the estimated resistance contributed by the package of the IC chip, e.g.,
wire bonds inside the chip case. The input impedance of the tag is equal to free space
impedance, 377 Ω. In order to estimate the power of the backscattered signal from M, we
introduce a coefficient α that relates modulation factor M to the power P.
Pf = α(r, f, Pc) ∗M, (7.13)
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where Pf is the power of the backscattered signal, α(r, f, Pc) is the coefficient that depends
on the distance of the probes to the DuT r, the frequency f , and the carrier power Pc. For
a specific frequency, since we keep the probe positions and the carrier power constant, α is
a constant as well.
To estimate those constants and build the impedance model, we implement a simple
circuit consisting of a flip-flop and an inverter as illustrated in Fig. 7.5. This simple circuit
switches between two impedance states, i.e., state 1 when the flip-flop is high and the
inverter is low, and state 2 when the flip-flop is low and the inverter is high. In order
to increase the logic utilization (the size of the circuit), which helps increase the strength
of the backscattered signal caused by switching activities, we combine multiple pairs of
flip-flops and inverters together, as illustrated in Fig. 7.6.
Figure 7.5: Simple flip-flop and inverter pair circuit.
We change the number of pairs of flip-flops and inverters to change the size of the cir-
cuit, and thus changing the signal strength caused by switching activities. As a result, we
have multiple designs with different sizes and logic utilizations. These designs are used to
program an FPGA and then we transmit a continuous wave at a frequency 3.031 GHz to-
ward the FPGA. We then measure the corresponding backscattered power at multiple clock
harmonics and peaks between clock harmonics. We then perform curve fitting to estimate
the values of R1, R0, 1jωC1 ,
1
jωC0
[119]. Fig. 7.7 shows the fitting curve after performing
curve-fitting for the measurements. As we can see, the fitting curve estimates well the real
measurement data. The estimated results of R1, R0, 1jωC1 ,
1
jωC0
are (7.024 kΩ, 3.364 kΩ,
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100.2 kΩ, 98,67 kΩ) which is within the range estimated in Section 7.2 and in [117].
Figure 7.6: Combination of multiple flip-flop and inverter pair circuit.
7.4 Golden-chip-Free Hardware Trojan Detection Technique
Our golden-chip-free hardware Trojan detection technique includes two phases: estimation
and detection.
7.4.1 Estimation
In the estimation phase, our technique uses the model in Section 7.3 to estimate the impedances
from the input circuit. The impedances are estimated based on the logic utilization on
FPGA of the circuit by using the equation 7.10. The parameters in the equation are es-
timated by performing cur-fitting as illustrated in Section 7.3. Then, the model estimates
the power of the backscattered signal of m clock harmonics and the confidence interval
(normally ± 5% of the power). Finally, it outputs the power and the confidence interval
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Figure 7.7: The fitting curve.
for each clock harmonics. These outputs will be the inputs of the detection phase. The
summary of this estimation phase is illustrated in Fig. 7.8.
7.4.2 Detection
First, a single measurement is obtained of the m amplitudes that correspond to the lowest
m harmonics of the IC’s clock frequency in the side-band of the signal that is backscattered
from the IC under test. Next, for each of the m amplitudes, we compute how much it de-
viates from the corresponding estimated value computed during the estimation phase. This
deviation is computed as the absolute value of the difference, and intuitively it measures
how much that amplitude differs from what would be expected from an HT-free IC. Finally,
the sum of these deviations is compared to the sum of the confidence interval from estima-
tion phase. The sum of the differences for the IC under test is a measure of how much its
overall backscattering “signature” differs from what would be expected from an HT-free
IC, and the sum of confidence interval from estimation phase corresponds to how much
an individual measurement of an HT-free IC can be expected to differ from the average of
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𝑀
𝑚=1  
Figure 7.8: Estimation flow.
lower than this detection threshold. The summary of this detection phase is illustrated in
Fig. 7.9.
7.5 Evaluation
7.5.1 Benchmark Implementation and Measurement Setup
We have implemented an 220-bit ripple adder circuit as illustrated in Fig. 7.10. We choose
to test on this simple sequential circuit first so we can have better intuition on how effective
our technique is and what is the limit before testing on real benchmarks. We inject a simple
hardware Trojan, whose trigger takes N-bit from the output of the ripple circuit as inputs
and get activated when a predefined sequence of values is detected. We change the number
of bits N to change the trigger size of the Trojan. The payload is just a shift register that
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Figure 7.9: Detection flow.
The Trojan-affected and Trojan-free designs are carefully mapped to the FPGA by us-
ing ECO (Engineering Change Order) tools so that they have the same layout except for
the Trojan part, thus making a fair comparison. The experimental setup to evaluate the
performance of the proposed algorithm is shown in Fig. 5.7. The setup includes a transmit-
ter Aaronia E1 electric-field near-field probe [103] connected to an Agilent MXG N5183A
signal generator [108], and a receiver Aaronia H2 magnetic field near-field probe [103]
connected to an Agilent MXA N9020A spectrum analyzer [109]. The devices-under-test
(DuT) are Altera DE0 Cyclone V FPGA boards [110]. An angle ruler is used as a positioner
so that different DE0-CV boards can be tested using approximately the same position of
probes. A laptop is used to control the devices and automate the measurements. A 3 GHz
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Figure 7.10: A ripple adder circuit.
Table 7.5: Summary of Trojan designs for the ripple adder circuit




continuous sinusoid signal is generated by the signal generator, and backscattered signals
are recorded by the spectrum analyzer. Table 7.5 summarizes the Trojan benchmarks.
7.5.2 Results
We evaluate the effectiveness of our HT detection prototype by applying HT detection to
four test subject circuits implemented on FPGA, including one original ripple adder de-
sign, and three Trojan-infected designs, in which each is infected by a Trojan in Table 7.5.
The impedance model allows us to estimate the power of the backscattered signal up to the
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third harmonics of the clock. We use these estimated values as the base to compare the
experiment values with. Each test subject design is measured 20 times, and each measure-
ment is used for HT detection in isolation, i.e., for each test subject, the detection makes

























Figure 7.11: Estimation and measurements of backscattered signal power for the ripple
adder and different Trojan-infected designs.
Fig. 7.11 shows estimation for the power of the backscattered signal of the clock har-
monics of a ripple adder circuit, and measurements for HT-free ripple adder and the TJ3-
infected ripple adder design. The figure shows that the estimation is pretty correct as the
TJ-free measurements cluster around the estimation. The TJ3-infected design measure-
ments are well separated from the TJ-free design measurements, which indicates that our
algorithm would be able to correctly detect all the TJ3-infected design measurements as
Trojan-infected ones. However, as the Trojan gets smaller in TJ1 and TJ2 designs, the
measurements are not separated from the TJ-free ones. Fig. 7.12 shows the ROC curves
when using our detection technique for these designs. The results show that we can detect
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Trojan 3 with 100% and 0% false positives, however, as the Trojan gets smaller, we can
only detect with 80% and 30% accuracy for Trojan 2, and 1, respectively if we want to keep
the 0% false positives. Compared to the previous sections, this golden-chip-free technique
requires the Trojan to be significantly bigger to be detected. This is because we only use
three clock harmonics in the model.























Figure 7.12: ROC curves for different Trojan-infected ripple circuit design.
7.6 Further Evaluation on Real Benchmark Circuits
To further evaluate the effectiveness of our HT detection prototype, we use the RS232
circuit with three HTs, from TrustHub. We choose the RS232 benchmark because its Trojan
designs can be easily increased in size. We implement two different extended versions of
RS232-T500 and a extended version of RS232-T300, whose trigger sizes are increased
bigger that the original one’s. Table summarizes the test designs we use.
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Table 7.6: Summary of Trojan designs for the RS232 circuit
Trojan design





• RS232-T500: The payload in this HT is a circuit that, upon activation, causes the
transmission to fail. The trigger is a sequential circuit that increments its counter
every clock cycle and activates the payload when this counter reaches a certain value.
• RS232-T300: The payload in this HT is a circuit that, upon activation, gains control
over two primary output signals. The trigger is a sequential comparator whose trigger
input probability is 8e−20.
We repeat the same experiments as in Section 7.5 for these test designs. The results
in Fig. 7.13 show that the expected values estimated by the model are accurate as the
TJ-free measurements are close to the model. This is similar to what we have observed
in the previous section. Both RS232-T500-ver1 and RS232-T300-ver1 measurements are
separated from the model and the TJ-free design measurements, which means that the
algorithm can detect them easily. However, as the Trojan gets smaller, the measurements
are not separated from the TJ-free ones, which means it is harder for the algorithm to
detect them. Fig. 7.14 shows the ROC curves when using our detection technique for these
designs. The results show that we can detect both RS232-T500-ver1 and RS232-T300-ver1
with 100% and 0% false positives, however, as the Trojan gets smaller, the accuracy of the






























Figure 7.13: Estimation and measurements of backscattered signal power for the rs232 and
different Trojan-infected designs.
7.7 Conclusions
Existing side-channel analysis based HT detection techniques rely on the assumption of
having a golden (HT-free) chip for training. This assumption of having a golden sample is
too strong, and often unrealistic, which prevents them from being used for practical deploy-
ments of HT detection. This chapter tackles the problem by proposing a novel golden-chip-
free hardware Trojan detection technique using backscattering side-channel with circuit’s
impedance modeling. We test our technique on multiple Trojan benchmarks and the results
show that our technique can detect Trojan with 100% accuracy and 0% false positives, if
the Trojan trigger is big enough.
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Figure 7.14: ROC curves for different Trojan-infected RS232 designs.
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CHAPTER 8
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
8.1 Conclusions
This research introduces a new physical side-channel, which we call the backscattering
side-channel, and propose novel hardware Trojan (HT) and counterfeit integrated circuit
(IC) detection techniques that exploit the backscattering side channel. Backscattering has
been used RFID communication system to enable RFID tags to transmit information to
RFID reader for decades, but it has never been used as a side-channel before this work.
The backscattering side-channel is a consequence of impedance changes in switching cir-
cuits, which is caused by the transistors’ two-state impedances modulating and reflecting
an injected carrier signal. As a result, this new side-channel is supposed to work well
for detecting malicious changes at the circuitry level of IC. This is proved by the results
that our proposed hardware Trojan (HT) and counterfeit integrated circuit (IC) detection
techniques using backscattering side-channel are capable of detecting different types of
inactive HTs and counterfeit ICs on multiple circuit benchmarks while tolerating manufac-
turing variation, and the backscattering side-channel outperforms other side-channels, such
as EM and power side-channels, when using the same detection prototypes. The research
contributions of this work are:
• Discover the backscattering side-channel, a new side-channel that is created by trans-
mitting a signal toward the IC, where the internal impedance changes caused by
on-chip switching activity change the circuit’s RCS, thus modulate the signal that
is backscattered (reflected) from the from the circuit with the information about
impedance changes in the system. Unlike other analog side-channels such as elec-
tromagnetic emanation (EM) and power, which are a consequence of current-flow
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changes inside the chip, backscattering side-channel is an impedance-based side
channel that is the consequence of impedance switching activities inside the chip.
If hardware Trojan is added to a circuit, it changes the impedance of the circuit even
if the Trojan is not activated. The changes will be reflected in the backscattered sig-
nal, which is beneficial to the detection of hardware Trojan. The same logic can
be applied for the detection of counterfeit ICs. The backscattering side-channel has
several advantages compared to other side-channels such as EM and power. These
advantages can be listed as follows:
– High bandwidth: This provides the capability of detecting small and fast switch-
ing Trojan activities.
– Signal strength not limited by leakage from devices: One characteristic that sets
the backscattering side-channel aside from others is that its signal strength can
be improved by increasing the carrier’s input power. As a result, the backscat-
tering side-channel can still work when there is very little leakage from devices.
– Adaptable frequency: By changing the carrier frequency, we can change the
working frequency of the backscattering side-channel. This helps to increase
the signal-to-noise ratio by shifting the frequency to avoid interrupts that might
distract the changes caused by HT activities.
• Propose novel techniques for the detection of hardware Trojan and counterfeit IC us-
ing the new backscattering side-channels. These techniques rely analyzing impedance
changes within sub-clock samples, where the changes caused by HTs happen and can
be observed on the clock signal, to detect malicious changes at the circuitry level.
They depends on having a golden (Trojan-free) chip to generate reference signals for
detecting malicious modifications (if existed) in the chip circuitry. To our knowledge,
this is the first off-chip side-channel technique capable of detecting inactive HTs and
counterfeit ICs while tolerating variations that exist across hardware instances. We
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experimentally confirm, using measurements on one physical instance for training
and nine other physical instances for testing, that the new techniques allow detection
of a dormant HT and counterfeit ICs with 100% accuracy, while producing no false
positives in HT-free measurements. Furthermore, additional experiments are con-
ducted to compare the backscattering-based detection to one that uses the traditional
EM-emanation-based side channel. These results show that backscattering-based de-
tection outperforms the EM side channel, confirm that dormant HTs are much more
difficult for detection than HTs that have been activated, and show how detection is
affected by changing the HT’s size and physical location on the IC.
• Model and quantitatively compare backscattering, electromagnetic (EM), and power
side-channels and discuss the performance of these three side-channels for detecting
software malware and hardware Trojans. Side-channel analysis is a powerful tool
both from attacker’s and from defender’s perspectives. Understanding similarities
and differences among a large number of side-channels is a necessary step in bet-
ter utilizing them. This work addresses this problem by modeling and quantitatively
comparing the backscattering, EM, and power side-channels and discussing the per-
formance of these three side-channels in detecting software malware and HT. We
proved that for larger changes in the signals, such as those caused by malware in-
trusions, all three side-channels perform similarly. However, when smaller changes
need to be observed, such as those caused by HTs, backscattering side-channel out-
performs EM and power side-channels.
• Propose a novel clustering algorithm that is capable of classifying a large population
of ICs into clusters without having a “golden” (known-to-be-HT-free) chip, and with
no a priori knowledge about circuitry of the chip. The technique bridges the gap be-
tween two existing hardware Trojan detection paradigms: accurate, but destructive,
expensive and time-consuming reverse engineering and cheap, fast and nondestruc-
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tive but goden-chip dependent side-channel analysis. This work proposes a novel
golden-chip-free clustering method using backscattering side-channel to divide ICs
into groups of Trojan-free and Trojan-infected boards. The technique requires no
golden chip or a priori knowledge of the chip circuitry, and divides a large population
of ICs into clusters based on how HTs (if existed) affect their backscattered signals.
This significantly reduces the size of test vectors for reverse engineering based de-
tection techniques, thus enables deployment of reverse engineering approaches to a
large population of ICs in a real testing scenario. We tested the proposed algorithm on
a set of 100 boards to thoroughly evaluate manufacturing variations among different
hardware instances. The results showed that our technique can tolerate manufactur-
ing variations among hardware instances to cluster all boards correctly for not only
9 different dormant Trojan designs on 3 different benchmark circuits from Trusthub,
but also dormant Trojan designs whose trigger size is as small as 0.19% of the origi-
nal circuit.
• Propose models to estimate impedances of a circuit and power of the backscattered
signal of clock harmonics, and introduce a golden-chip-free hardware Trojan detec-
tion technique using these models.
8.2 Future Work
8.2.1 Exploiting High Spatial Resolution of Backscattering Side-Channel for Hardware
Trojan Detection
One of the advantages of backscattering side-channel is that it offers high spacial resolution,
which means it can focus on specific part of the chip. However, the probes we currently use
are almost as big as the whole chip, which prevents us from exploiting the high spacial res-
olution of backscattering side-channel. With a smaller probe, techniques can be developed
to scan through the chip and to investigate if it helps to improve the detection accuracy and
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give information about the location of HTs in the chip.
8.2.2 Improving Golden-Chip Free Hardware Trojan Detection Techniques
As discussed throughout this thesis, one of the main drawbacks of existing side-channel
based HT detection techniques is the dependence on having a golden (HT-free) sample.
This thesis proposed novel golden free HT detection techniques by modeling the circuit to
estimate its impedance, and estimating the power of the backscattering side-channel signal.
The results show that our techniques are capable of detecting Trojans with 100% accuracy
and 0% false positive if the Trojan is big enough. The model needs to be refined so it
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